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In 1994 the Danish Bankruptcy Committee
1
published a report on reorganization
2
The Reorganization Report was drafted after the Minister of Justice in 1993 had requested
the Bankruptcy Committee to consider a reform of the current bankruptcy legislation. In
its report, the Bankruptcy Committee concluded that in the years preceding 1994 there
had been a significant increase in the number of businesses which had been liquidated
.
Furthermore, the Bankruptcy Committee concluded that the increase in the number of
liquidations to some extent was caused by flaws and inefficiencies in the current
legislation These flaws and inefficiencies are identified in the Reorganization Report as
problems to be considered in a future reform of the Danish Bankruptcy Act.
4
The purpose of this Thesis is in the light of the United States laws on reorganization
to examine and discuss some of the problems listed in the Reorganization Report
5
It is




The name of the report is "Rekonstruktion - Et ldeoplaeg" dated 12 September 1994 This report is
hereinafter referred to as the "Reorganization Report".
3
The Bankruptcy Committee concluded that not only had there been an increase in the number of
liquidations, the businesses liquidated included an increasing number of old and well established
businesses.
4 An inquiry to the Ministry of Justice in April 1997 showed that the Bankruptcy Committee has not
discussed a reform of the rules on reorganization after the Reorganization Report was published in 1994.
However, it is expected that the Bankruptcy Committee will reassume its work on this matter during the
Fall of 1997 Id.
5
See infra Part IV This Thesis focuses primarily on reorganization of businesses. Reorganization of
individuals is not discussed, unless such individuals are involved in some kind of financial activity.
superior to or more effective than the current Danish legislation/' However, the purpose
of this Thesis is not to decide which of the two systems is the better one The purpose is
to analyze and discuss a list of specific problems in the current Danish system and in this
analysis to examine how these problems are dealt with under the United States laws on
reorganization
The Thesis consists of five parts in addition to this Introduction Part II is an
introduction to the laws on reorganization in Denmark and in the United States Part II
also includes a brief introduction to out-of-court workouts as an alternative to
reorganization under the bankruptcy laws Part III provides statistical information on the
number of reorganizations, the outcome of reorganizations, debtor demographics etc Part
IV is the heart of the Thesis in which the problems identified in the Reorganization Report
are analyzed and discussed In Part V, conclusions and suggestions to the future reform of
the Danish Bankruptcy Act are summarized, and finally in Part VI the bibliography lists
the sources and references used throughout the text.
6
The reorganization procedure under chapter 1 1 of the Bankruptcy Code has been criticized for being
unreasonably expensive and causing unnecessary delay. Furthermore, emphencal studies suggest that the
plan confirmation rate under chapter 1 1 is modest See John D. Aver. The Role of Finance Theory in
Shaping Bankruptcy Policy. 3 Am Bankr Inst. Rev. 53 (1995); Robert K Rasmussen & David A. Skeel.
Jr. The Economic Analysis of Corporate Bankruptcy Law. 3 Am. Bankr. Inst. L Rev 85 (1995): Barry
E Adler. A World Without Debt. 72 Wash. U L Q 811 (1994); James W. Bowers. Rehabilitation.
Redistribution or Dissipation: Evidence for Choosing Among Bankruptcy Hypotheses. 72 Wash U. L Q
(1994); Lynn M. Lopucki. The Trouble With Chapter 11. 1993 Wis. L. Rev. 729; Michael Bradley &
Michael Rosenweig. The Untenable Case for Chapter 11. 101 Yale L. J 1043 (1992)
II. Introduction to Reorganization in Denmark and in the United States
Financial problems usually do not arise overnight but grow bigger over a period of
time until a point in time where they cannot be ignored anymore If the financial problems
are dealt with in a timely manner
7
, it may be possible to reorganize the business outside
bankruptcy in a so-called "out-of-court workout".
A. Out-of-Court Workouts
An out-of-court workout is usually preferable both to the debtor and to the creditors
because it is faster, cheaper, and less formal Furthermore, the debtor may prefer a
workout where such is possible because the mere filing of a petition of bankruptcy in most
cases has a substantial adverse effect on the debtor's business and goodwill
8
In addition
hereto, out-of-court workouts are preferable to society in general, because they impose
Failure to take corrective actions before it is too late is the cause for many unsuccessful reorganizations
See the Reorganization Report, at 67 The delay is often caused by managements unawareness of the
financial problems because of insufficient or erroneous financial data Id. Once the problems are
recognized additional delay may occur because the management hesitate to take the necessary actions
8
In Denmark, there has been observed a substantial negative effect on the going concern not only when a
debtor files for bankruptcy but also when a debtor files a petition for suspension of payments This has
been a major obstacle in the efforts to make suspension of payments an effective tool for the establishment
of out-of-court workouts To reduce the negative effects of the words "bankruptcy"" and "suspension of
payments", the Danish Bankruptcy Committee emphasizes the importance of communicating that
proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act can be used, not only to liquidate businesses, but also to save and
reorganize such entities See the Reorganization Report, at 63.
less costs on society than reorganizations under the bankruptcy laws
''
Thus, good reasons
exist for reorganizing the debtor's business out of court whenever that is possible, and it is
important that the bankruptcy legislation is drafted with the purpose to further out-of-
court workouts In Denmark, the legislators have acknowledged the importance of
supporting out-of-court workouts with the enactment of the rules on suspension of
payments.
10
In the United States, no similar set of rules exists However, the mere
possibility of filing a chapter 1 1 petition normally furthers the negotiation of an out-of-
court workout
In spite of its many qualities, an out-of-court workout has some shortcomings which
may stand as a serious obstacle for a reorganization outside of bankruptcy First, outside
of bankruptcy, execution of debts operates on a "first come, first served" basis, i.e. the
first creditor to obtain a lien normally has priority over the other creditors " The
creditors, therefore, have a strong incentive to "race to the court house" to get a judgment
to levy on because it is risky for them to await the results of the debtor's attempt to
reorganize Second, because the debtor cannot stay creditors' actions, foreclosure may
force the debtor to cease business because essential assets are no longer available Finally,
a workout is contractual and voluntary, and requires acceptance from all creditors
Dissenting creditors cannot be forced into the workout and the existence of only a few
uncooperative creditors can therefore destroy all prospects of an out-of-court workout
12
9
Financial problems of private businesses reduce the total wealth of society and are therefore a "cost" of
society.
u
' See infra Part UB 1
1
Liens obtained less than 90 days before a bankruptcy petition is filed are avoidable both in Denmark
and in the United States. See the Damsh Bankruptcy Act. sec 70. and 1 1 U.S.C.. sec. 547 (1994)
" The problem with dissenting creditors can be reduced by fully paying out smaller creditors This will
not only reduce the number of creditors but also take out some of the creditors which are most likely to
object While larger businesses usually expect some losses on their collectives, this is normally not the
B. Danish Bankruptcy Legislation on Reorganization
The rules in the Danish Bankruptcy Act concerning reorganization include the rules






1. Suspension of Payments
When Denmark in 1975 16 and 1977 reformed its previous Bankruptcy Act of 1872,
the rules on suspension of payments were introduced with the purpose of furthering
reorganization However, these first rules on suspension of payments did not become the
case for smaller business owners They expect to be paid in full and are therefore in many cases more
uncooperative than the larger creditors
13
See infra Part UB .1.
'
' See infra Part II.B.2.
15
According to the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec. 197. subsec 3 only individuals can file for debt
rescheduling Furthermore, a debt rescheduling plan is normally only confirmed if the debtor is no longer
involved in business activities, see Vestre Landsrets sag 288/1985 [The Western High Court, case no
288/1985| This Thesis focuses on reorganization of debtors engaged in business activities and the rules
on debt rescheduling are therefore not discussed
16
Lov nr. 266 af 26. juni 1975 [Act no 266 on Bankruptcy and Suspension of Payments of 26 June 1975]
' Lov nr. 298 af 8 juni 1977 [Act no 298 on Bankruptcy of 8 June 1977. (hereinafter referred to as "the
Danish Bankruptcy Act") The rules on suspension of payments enacted in 1975 were implemented in the
1977-Act). The drafting of the Danish Bankruptcy Act was a result of a collaborate work between
Bankruptcy Committees in Denmark. Norway and Sweden and the insolvency legislation in these
countries, and therefore, share significant common features Denmark. Norway and Sweden have in
addition entered into a Nordic Convention on Bankruptcy However, the Convention have had only little
practical importance.
success the drafters had intended,
,x
and already in 1984 a complete reform of the rules
took place.
19
The present rules on suspension of payments are found in sections 10 through 16e of
the Danish Bankruptcy Act The rules were enacted with the purpose of supporting out-
of-court workouts,
20
however, most debtors will suspend payments also during the
preparation of a compulsory composition
.
a. Filing of the Petition and Appointment of a Supervisor
The suspension of payments procedure is initiated by the debtor's filing of a petition
with the bankruptcy court.
22




See NIELS 0RGAARD. BETALINGSSTANDSNING. at 267-283 (1979). Based on a survey made in
1978 this commentator found that in only 10-15 percent of the cases where the debtor had suspended its
payments the debtor would actually be reorganized. Id. at 270
19
Lov nr 187 af 9 maj 1984 |Act no. 187. 9 May 1984]. This reform especially strengthened the
creditors" position by gmng them more influence on the debtor's actions during the period of suspension
of payments.
See Folketingstidende 1974/75. 2 samling. tillsg A sp 3985 [Official Report of the Folketing
Proceedings. 2nd Session. Supplement A. Column 3985(1974/75)]
n
In addition hereto, suspension of payments are used regularly where no hope of reorganization exists.
The suspension of payments in these situations are used with the purpose of liquidating the estate over a
period of time to obtain a better price
" See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec. 3. subsec. 1. Suspension of payments can be initiated by a debtor
which believes it is incapable of fulfilling its obligations to the creditors See the Danish Bankruptcy Act
sec. 10. subsec. 1
23
Creditors may. however, be able to force a debtor into a proceeding similar to a suspension of payments
proceeding This result can be obtained by the creditors' filing of an involuntary bankruptcy petition
against the debtor Provided that the requirements for commencing a bankruptcy procedure exist, the
debtor will have to use section 24 of the Danish Bankruptcy Act to suspend the bankruptcy procedure
7
petition for suspension of payments must contain the debtor's suggestion to which
person
24
is going to act as supervisor during the suspension of payments" The supervisor
is appointed by the bankruptcy court
26
but usually the person suggested by the debtor will
be appointed.
The supervisor safeguards the creditors' interests during the period of suspension of
payments and he must therefore, inform the creditors about the affairs of the estate
28
Thus, no later than one week after the suspension of payments, the supervisor must
provide the creditors with information on the debtor's financial situation"
11
and information
on what steps to reorganize the debtor will take.
30
This information is given to the
creditors in circular letters and meetings in the bankruptcy court
?1
The bankruptcy procedure will be suspended under this section if the debtor can show that a workout is
being attempted During this suspension, the rules on suspension of payments apply
4
Where a large business suspend its payments, there may be appointed two or three supervisors
25
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec. 10. subsec 2.
26
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec 11. subsec 1.
If the bankruptcy court has been informed of circumstances which indicate that a majority of the
creditors will oppose the suggested supemsor. another person must be appointed, see Betsnkning om
Betalingsstandsning 983/1993. side 14 [Report on Suspension of Payments no. 983. 14 (1983)]
2
* Upon the request of a creditor, the bankruptcy court can establish a creditors committee, which by the
supervisor must be kept informed about the affairs of the business on an ongoing basis See the Danish
Bankruptcy Act sec 14 and sec 15. subsec 4
"9
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec. 12. no 1 The supervisor may engage professionals to assist him
during the suspension of payments See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec 15. subsec 3
30
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec. 12. no. 3
1
The first meeting must be held no later than 3 weeks after the filing of the petition. See sec 1 1. subsec.
2 of the Damsh Bankruptcy Act. At this meeting the supervisor will discuss with the creditors the
material sent out in the first circular letter On the basis of the information given at the first meeting, the
bankruptcy court decides whether the suspension of payments should continue The bankruptcy court
almost always decides that the suspension of payments shall continue, but if the meeting reveals that there
are no prospects of a reorganization, or if the debtor is uncooperative, the bankruptcy court may cease the
suspension of payments at this meeting, or at any later point in time
8
The debtor remains in possession of the estate during the suspension of payments
However, the debtor is not allowed to carry out significant acts of management without
the acceptance of the supervisor, and payment of debts are allowed only if it is made in
accordance with the rules on priority of claims, or if the payment is necessary in order to
avoid losses . The legislative history gives as examples of significant acts of management
to be approved by the supervisor, sale of major assets, or the decision to close down
major operations ' In reality, the decisions which are approved by the supervisor are
much more extensive and as a general rule, the supervisor approves all acts of
management
4
The legal effect of the supervisor's approval is that claims concerning such
acts will have a priority position in a subsequent liquidation proceeding
b. Effects of the Suspension of Payments
The suspension of payments takes effect from the moment it is received by the
bankruptcy court and "freezes" the claims of the existing creditors for the time being, so
that these claims are not to be paid or secured. Actions against the debtor based on
unsecured claims are automatically stayed
36
Generally, actions to collect secured claims
3:
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec 15. subsec. 1.
See Report no 606 (II) on Bankruptcy and Compulsory Composition (1977). at 67. The above
mentioned acts of management might be considered particularly significant acts of management and
would therefore have to be submitted to the creditors according to the section 15. subsection 4 of the
Danish Bankruptcy Act The creditors can set aside such intended particularly significant acts of
management if creditors representing 25% or more of the unsecured and non-priority claims object.
34
See LARS LINDENCRONE & NIELS 0RGAARD. BETALINGSSTANDSNINGSRET (1990). at 88.
35
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act. sec. 94 (2)
36
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec 16.
9
are not stayed but the bankruptcy court may stay such actions if the continued collection
will disturb the reorganization
c. Expiry and Extension of the Suspension of Payments
The suspension of payments automatically expires 3 months after the filing of the
petition
38
However, the bankruptcy court may extend the suspension of payments by
periods of up to three months, thereby extending it up to a maximum of one year after the
filing of the petition.
2. Compulsory Composition
The rules on compulsory composition are found in sections 157 through 196 of the
Danish Bankruptcy Act.
40
The purpose of compulsory composition is to provide debtors
with an opportunity to continue a financially distressed but otherwise profitable business.
4




See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec 16e. subsec 1. no 5.
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec 16e. subsec 2
Prior to the enactment of the Danish Bankruptcy Act in 1977. the rules on compulsory composition
were not included in the Bankruptcy Act
The purpose of compulsory composition is also to operate as a lever for obtaining out-of-court
workouts. The voluntary composition plan is usually drafted in accordance with the rules governing
compulsory composition so that the compulsory procedure can be used if one or more of the creditors are
reluctant to consent to the workout plan. See MOGENS MUNCH. KOMMENTERET KONKURSLOV. 7.
udgave 1993. side 725 [MOGENS MUNCH. THE DANISH BANKRUPTCY ACT ANNOTATED. 725.
7thed.(1993)].
10
The compulsory composition plan may include a debt reduction, ~ or a payment
extension,
43
or, what is the usual proposition, a combination of both
44
a. Composition Debt
The compulsory composition includes debts
45
which incurred prior to the opening of
the composition negotiations
46
The composition does not include secured debt
47
and debt
which would have a priority position in a bankruptcy proceeding
4X
Furthermore, debts
under a certain fixed amount are usually not included in the composition and, therefore,
42
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec. 157. no 1
43
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec 157. no. 3. A moratorium allows the debtor to repay its debt over a
longer period of time.
,4
As mentioned above, the debtor usually seeks compulsory composition with the purpose of continuing
the business However, according to section 157. paragraph 2 of the Danish Bankruptcy Act it is possible
to file a petition for compulsory composition in connection with a liquidation (composition in bankruptcy)
with the purpose of discharging the debtor from unpaid obligations at the end of the liquidation
proceeding This is relevant to individuals because the Danish Bankruptcy Act does not automatically
discharge the debtor from unpaid obligations at the end of the liquidation proceeding
45
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec 158. subsec 1
1
Debts incurred after the opening of the composition negotiations are not included in the composition
Such debts have no priority in a subsequent liquidation proceeding, unless approved by a supervisor
appointed under section 168. subsection 2 of the Danish Bankruptcy Act
' See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec. 158. subsec 2. no. 1 Only debt which is actually secured is
excluded and if the debt exceeds the value of the asset in which the creditor has a secured interest such
debt is considered unsecured and included in the composition Id.
48
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec. 158. subsec. 2. no 2 Debts with priority position in a liquidation
proceeding include administrative expenses; debts incurred during the liquidation proceeding: certain
debts incurred just prior to the liquidation proceeding in an attempt to avoid liquidation, debts incurred
during a suspension of payments: debts relating to employees; and certain retail duty claims not including
VAT See generally the Danish Bankruptcy Act sees. 92-96.
11
those creditors will be paid cash in full
4<
' The debts included in the composition*
1
" will be
"frozen" at the date of the opening of the composition negotiations and interest will be
added only until this date.
5 '
b. Preparing the Composition
Prior to the opening of the composition negotiations, the debtor must provide the
bankruptcy court with the composition proposal and certain material showing the debtor's
financial situation This material, which is prepared by two so-called assignees,
52
consists
of a balance sheet showing the debtor's assets and debt liabilities '" and a statement from
the assignees In the statement the assignees must advise the bankruptcy court and the
creditors on whether the composition proposal in their opinion is reasonable and offers
sufficient assurance of fulfillment
54
Also, if the assignees have discovered any avoidable
transactions this must appear from their statement In addition to the balance sheet, the
19
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec 158. subsec 2. no 4. Payment of smaller creditors may be a
substantial administrative relief The Bankruptcy Act does not define the amount that may be excluded
from the composition Legislative history suggests approximately DKK 500 [USD 85 1 Additional
guidance maybe found in SD-Cirk 1987-50 nr 2.6.1 (Tax Circular no 2 6 1(1987-50)) which permits
local tax authorities to accept compositions which include payment of "small debts'" up to a maximum of
DKK 5.000 [USD 850]
50
Hereinafter referred to as the "composition debts'"
51
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec 159. subsec 1
>2
Assignees are appointed by the Ministry of Justice as experts in either industry/trade or accountancy.
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec 164 Certified Public Accountants are automatically considered
experts on accountancy Id.
53
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec 165. subsec. 2
54
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec 165. subsec. 3.
55
Id.
debtor must provide the bankruptcy court with statements of acceptances from at least 40
percent of the composition creditors in terms of both amount and number of creditors.
56
c. Composition Negotiations
When the debtor has the composition proposal, the material prepared by the
assignees, and the acceptance statements ready all of it must be submitted to the
bankruptcy court with a petition to open the composition negotiations The bankruptcy
court opens the composition negotiations if the court believes that the basis for the
composition is sound and realistic
58
As a condition for the opening of the composition
negotiations, the bankruptcy court may require that the negotiations are monitored by a
supervisor.
9
Immediately after the opening of the composition negotiations the bankruptcy court
summons the creditors to a meeting to discuss and vote on the composition proposal.
60
In
order to accept the proposal a qualified majority of the creditors both in terms of number
and amount must vote to accept the proposal Thus, at least 60 percent of the number of
56
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec. 166. subsec. 1. no 2.
The preparation of a compulsory composition is not done overnight and during this period the debtor
usually files for a suspension of payments in order to stay commencement and continuation of actions
initiated against the debtor "s assets..
58
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec 168. subsec. 1.
'9
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec. 168. subsec. 2. This section refers to section 15 of the Danish
Bankruptcy Act. Thus, the supervision with the composition negotiations is similar to the mandatory
supervision appointed in a suspension of payments However, the debtor will usually suspend payments
while the composition proposal is prepared and the bankruptcy court will then normally decide that the
supervision appointed in the suspension of payments continues during the composition negotiations.
50
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec. 169. The creditors are convened by means of a notice in the Danish
Official Gazette However, the debtor is under obligation to notify all known creditors. Id.
13
creditors who participate in the vote must vote in favor of the proposal ' In addition
hereto those creditors who vote to accept the proposal must represent a certain
percentage of the entire composition debt This percentage is calculated on the basis of
the proposed payment, i.e. the lower the proposed payment is, the higher the percentage
of creditors who accept the proposal must be Thus, the percentage of creditors who vote
to accept the proposal must be at least 100 percent minus the percentage which the
proposal offers to the composition creditors If for example the proposal offers the
composition creditors 30 percent payment, the amount of creditors who vote to accept the
proposal must represent at least 70 percent of the composition debt If for example only
the required minimum payment of 25 percent is offered, at least 75 percent of the
creditors in terms of amount must vote to accept the proposal
62
If the composition
includes only an extension of payments but not a reduction of the debt, the acceptance
requirements are less strict and the proposal is accepted if 60 percent of the creditors both
in terms of number and amount vote to accept the proposal /"
If the proposal is not accepted, the composition negotiations cease unless the
bankruptcy court decides that a new meeting should be convened to vote on the proposal
again
64
If the proposal is accepted the composition becomes effective when the
bankruptcy court has confirmed it Composition creditors may object to the confirmation
of the composition but an objection must be raised during the meeting at which the
1
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec 176. subs 1
'"
If the proposal offers the creditors 40 percent payment at least 60 percent of the creditors in terms of
amount must vote to accept the proposal Sixty percent is the minimum requirement, i.e. if the proposal
offers 50 percent there still have to be 60 percent of the creditors in terms of amount who vote to accept
the proposal.
63
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec 178. subs 2. no 3.
14
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec 177 It would be relevant to vote on the proposal again if a major
creditor was not present at the first meeting and can be expected to participate in a subsequent meeting
65




The bankruptcy court must not affirm a composition if
procedural errors have occurred, if the bankruptcy court has erred in the application of the
law, or if the debtor in order to obtain acceptances of the proposal has promised one or
more creditors a priority position which does not conform with the Danish Bankruptcy
Act.
6
Additionally, the bankruptcy court may decline confirmation of the composition if
any third party unduly has tried to influence the negotiations, if the payment offered to the
creditors does not match the debtor's financial abilities, if the debtor's financial distress is
caused by improper deterioration of assets, if the composition proposal is not likely to be
fulfilled, or if the composition is otherwise to the detriment of one or more creditors.
68
The bankruptcy court can make the confirmation conditional on appointment of a
supervisor to monitor the fulfillment of the composition. The bankruptcy court's
decision to confirm or not to confirm the composition can be appealed to the High Court
within a 2 weeks' period
70
From the opening of the composition negotiations and until the negotiations have
ended,
71





See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec 178, subsec. 2.
6
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec 179
68
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec. 180.
39
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec. 181. The supervision mentioned in note 59 automatically ceases
when the composition is affirmed.
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sees 247 and 251.
The composition negotiations end when the 2 weeks" appeal period of the bankruptcy court s
confirmation decision has expired and no appeal is made, or if the decision is appealed, when the
appellant court has made its decision See the Damsh Bankruptcy Act sec 183. subsec 1.
" Debts which are not affected by the composition, i.e. secured and priority creditors can initiate actions
against the debtor Any small creditors which according to the proposal are paid 100 percent could in
theory move to collect their debt However, until the bankruptcy court according to section 158. subsection
2. no 4 of the Danish Bankruptcy Act has decided whether fully payment of such creditors is reasonable.
15
The avoiding powers granted the trustee in a liquidation proceeding
4
are applicable
also in the composition proceeding
75
Any composition creditor may propose that actions
to set aside avoidable preferences or transfers are initiated
6
The composition creditors
vote on this proposal
77
and if a majority
78
vote to accept that an action is filed, the
bankruptcy court appoints an attorney to conduct the case
,
79
If the creditors decide that
an action should not be filed, any composition creditor can file a suit individually
8" In any
case, an action must be filed not later than 4 weeks after the bankruptcy court has
confirmed the composition
81
no judgments can be executed. See MOGENS MUNCH. THE DANISH BANKRUPTCY ACT
ANNOTATED. 760. 7th ed. (1993).
3
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec 171
4
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sees 64-80
5
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec 184 The avoiding powers were introduced into the composition
proceeding to avoid that debtors should choose liquidation rather than compulsory composition where
avoidable actions had occurred. See MOGENS MUNCH. THE DANISH BANKRUPTCY ACT
ANNOTATED. 777. 7th ed (1993).
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec 186. subsec. 1 A proposal to initiate an action to set aside
avoidable preferences or transfers must be filed with the bankruptcy court not later than at the meeting at
which the creditors vote to accept the composition proposal. Id.
The creditor against whom the action will be addressed is not eligible to participate in the vote. See
MOGENS MUNCH. THE DANISH BANKRUPTCY ACT ANNOTATED. 781. 7th ed. (1993)
8
By means of amount. See the Damsh Bankruptcy Act sec. 175. subsec. 1.
19
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec. 186. subsec. 1. Before an attorney is appointed, the bankruptcy
court must make sure that the debtor will be able to pay the fees involved with the suit. Id.
*° See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec. 186. subsec. 2 A creditor must announce its intention to file suit
individually at the same meeting. Id.
81
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec 186. subsec. 3.
16
d. Effects of the Composition
The affirmed composition has the effect of a court settlement
82
and it is binding on all
the composition creditors whether or not such creditors have filed their claims. The
writing down of the debts and/or extension of payments effect not only claims from
creditors directly but also claims for indemnification from guarantors who have redeemed
creditors
4
e. Cancellation of the Composition
A composition creditor, or, if such is appointed, the supervisor may file a complaint
with the bankruptcy court ordering the composition cancelled if the debtor willfully
neglects to maintain its obligations according to the composition, or it is disclosed that
fraudulent misrepresentation has occurred prior to the confirmation of the composition.
85
If the composition is canceled any reduction of debt or extension of payments are
disregarded, and the debtor is liable for the entire debt reduced only for any installments
made in the interim.
86
1
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec 189. According to sec 478. subsec 1. no 2 of the Danish
Administration of Justice Act a court settlement operates as a basis of execution and actions to
enforcement the composition can be initiated immediately if the debtor fails to make the installments
provided for in the composition
83
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec. 190.
84
Id. Although a guarantors claim for indemnification is reduced according to the composition, it follows
from section 191 of the Danish Bankruptcy Act that the creditor is entitled to claim full payment from the
guarantor
85
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec. 194. subsec. 1.
86
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec 194. subsec 3.
17
If the composition is not cancelled but the debtor's estate subsequently is liquidated,
the creditors are entitled to file the principal amount owed reduced only for installments
made prior to the filing of the petition to liquidate the estate The creditors, however, are
not entitled to receive actual payments in excess of the amount the creditors accepted to
receive in the composition
88
C. United States Legislation on Reorganization
The bankruptcy laws of the United States are federal laws The Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978
89
(commonly referred to as "Bankruptcy Code") was enacted on 6 November
1978 in order to modernize the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. The Bankruptcy Code is
divided into the following chapters: 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 12 and 13 Chapters 1, 3 and 5
contain definitions and general provisions applicable to all proceeding under the
Bankruptcy Code
91
The remaining chapters divide the Bankruptcy Code into the
following proceedings:
Chapter 7 Liquidation proceedings




Chapter 12 Proceedings to adjust the debts of a family farmer




Title 11 of the United States Code. Pub L No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549
90
United States Bankruptcy Act of 1898. ch 541. 30 Stat. 544
1
The procedure in the bankruptcy courts are governed by the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. In
addition hereto, obligator, model forms for most bankruptcy documents are found in the Official
Bankruptcy Forms.
18
Chapter 13 Proceedings to adjust the debts of an individual with regular income
All the proceedings in chapters 9, 11, 12 and 13 are reorganization proceedings
However, this Thesis focuses on reorganization of businesses and thus only reorganization
under chapter 1 1 is described in the following introduction to the United States laws on
92
reorganization
1. Commencement of the Chapter 11 Proceeding




Enterprises that are not eligible for chapter 1 1 relief are insurance and banking
institutions, stockbrokers and commodity brokers.
94
A chapter 1 1 proceeding is commenced voluntarily by the debtor's filing of a petition
with the bankruptcy court.
9
Also, a chapter 11 proceeding may be commenced
involuntarily
96
by three or more creditors' filing of petitions
97
The petitioning creditors
' Sections 1 161 through 1 174 of chapter 1 1 govern reorganization of railroads These pro\isions are not
discussed in this Thesis.
13
1 1 U.S.C sec 109 (b) and (d) (1994). It is not a requirement for an individual to be eligible for chapter
1 1 relief that he or she operates a business See Toibb v Radloff. 501 U.S. 157 (1991).
The rules governing insolvency proceedings of such institutions are included in the legislation
governing the conduction of those businesses
'5
See 11 U.S.C. sec. 301 (1994). Venue is the district in which the debtor maintained its domicile,
residence, or principal place of business in the United States for 180 days preceding the filing of the
petition See 28 U.S.C. sec. 1408 (1) (1994). Also, the district in which the debtor has its principal assets
in the United States may serve as venue for the filing of the petition Id.
' The Danish Bankruptcy Act does not allow creditors to file petitions neither for suspension of
payments nor for commencement of compulsory composition. See supra Parts II B. la and II B 2. Only
the debtor can submit the composition proposal and. therefore, it would make little sense to allow the
creditors to file a petition for commencement of the proceeding.
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must hold unsecured claims
9
* in the aggregate amount of at least $10,000, and the claims
must be non-contingent and not subject to a bona fide dispute Although the Bankruptcy
Code does not explicitly require a good faith filing requirement, the courts generally have
imposed such requirement on the petitioner
The filing of a voluntary petition not only commences the reorganization proceeding
but also constitutes an order for relief
100
Where involuntary petitions are filed, the debtor
is allowed to file answers to the involuntary petitions and have a trial held before relief is
ordered Relief is ordered if the debtor does not timely controvert the petition,
101
or if the
debtor is generally not paying its debts as they become due.
102
If at the hearing relief is not
ordered, the court may grant a judgment ordering the petitioners to pay to the debtor
costs or a reasonable attorney's fee.
103
Furthermore, if the petition is filed in bad faith the
court may order the petitioners to pay damages or punitive damages.
104
1 1 U.SC. sec. 303 (1994). If there are less than 12 holders of claims against the debtor, the petition can
be filed by a single creditor Id
98
Id. A partially secured creditor is an undersecured creditor to the extent the value of the collateral does
not cover the claim See 1 1 U.SC. sec. 506 (a) (1994)
99
See In re Thirtieth Place. Inc . 30 BR. 503 (9th Cir BAP Aru 1983). In re Mancamp Square
Associates. Ltd . 139 BR 554 (Bankr M.D. Fla 1992). and In re Bryson Properties XVIII. 129 BR 449
(M.D.N.C. 1991)
1<)" 11 U.SC. sec. 301 (1994) The Bankruptcy Code docs not define the term "relief It is. however,
generally defined as the assistance or redress which is sought at the hands of a court. See BLACKS LAW
DICTIONARY 1292 (6th ed 1990) Thus, in the bankruptcy context, an order for relief under one of the
chapters of the Bankruptcy Code is an order for protection and access to the legal remedies contained in
this particular chapter of the Bankruptcy Code.
1
11 U.SC. sec. 303 (h) (1994). Generally, the debtor must file its answer within 20 days after the
involuntary petitions have been serviced See Bankruptcy Rule 101
1
102
11 U.SC. sec 303 (h) (1) (1994).
103
11 U.SC. sec. 303 (i) (1) (1994).
1,11
11 U.SC. sec. 303(i) (2) (1994).
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2. The Debtor in Possession
Once the chapter 1 1 proceeding is commenced, the business is operated by the debtor
in possession, unless circumstances warrant the appointment of a trustee ° The "debtor
in possession" is for most purposes the same entity as the "debtor" prior to the
commencement of the chapter 11 proceeding Thus, the business is generally managed
by the same people as prior to the commencement of the case
The rights, powers, and duties of the debtor in possession are defined in section 1 107
of the Bankruptcy Code This provision grants, with some limitations, the debtor in
possession all the rights, powers, functions and duties of a trustee For example, the
debtor in possession may operate the business,
107
use the property of the estate and enter
into transactions in the ordinary course of business,
108
or commence actions to recover
property or avoid liens on property of the estate.
109
The debtor in possession owes fiduciary duties to both the shareholders and the
creditors of the estate, and breach of those duties may result in the appointment of trustee
under section 1 1 04 of the Bankruptcy Code, or denial of confirmation of the plan under
section 1129 As the Supreme Court in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v.
105
See 1 1 USC sec 1 104 (1994). See also infra Pari II.C.3.C
106
The Bankruptcy Code defines "debtor in possession" as the "debtor except when a person that has
qualified under section 322 of this title is serving as trustee in the case" See 11 USC sec 1101 (1)
(1994) It is necessary to give the debtor "possession" because the commencement of a chapter 11
proceeding creates an estate which holds title to the property of the debtor. See infra Part II C 4a.
107
See 11 USC. sec 1108(1994).
,8
See 11 U.S.C. sec. 363 (c) (1994). However, if the transaction requires use of cash collateral, the
debtor in possession must first obtain court authorization, unless the entities which have the interest in
such cash collateral consent Id.
109
See 1 1 USC sees 542. 543. 544. 545. 547. 548. and 549 (1994).
Weintraub explained "the willingness of courts to leave debtors in possession is
premised upon assurance that the officers and managing employees can be depended upon
to carry out the fiduciary responsibilities of a trustee
11
3. Controlling and Supervising the Reorganization
The district court have original jurisdiction in bankruptcy cases ' " However, the
district court may refer bankruptcy cases to the bankruptcy judge of the district,
11,
and for
all practical matters, the bankruptcy court has the jurisdiction in bankruptcy cases.
1 ' 4
The bankruptcy court's core function in a chapter 1 1 case is judicial and the court is
supposed to be only modestly involved in the administration of the case.
115
Control and
supervision primarily rests with the United States Trustee, the Creditors
1
Committee, and,
if necessary, with a trustee appointed or elected for the particular case.
110 Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub. 471 U.S. 343 (1985)
111
Id. at 355. citing Wolf v. Weinstein. 372 U.S. 633. 651 (1963).
112
See 28 U.S.C. sec. 1334 (a) (1994)
113
See 28 U.S.C. sec. 157(a).
114
The district court is appeal court for decisions made by the bankruptcy court. See 28 U.S.C. sec. 158





The bankruptcy judge normally only learns about the cases in the context of adversarial proceedings
which are brought before the court to decide However, if the bankruptcy judge wants to follow a case
closer, the judge has authority to hold status conferences. See 1 1 U.S.C sec. 105 (d) (1994).
22
a. The United States Trustee
The United States Trustee system was implemented on a permanent basis in 1986
1U>
in an attempt to remove the administration of chapter 1 1 cases from the bankruptcy
courts Most of the duties of the United States Trustee
117
are of a monitory or supervisory
nature,
118
but they also include appointment of the creditors' committee and additional
committees of creditors or equity security holders
119
Also, where the appointment of a
trustee or an examiner is ordered by the bankruptcy court, the United States trustee
appoints such trustee or examiner subject to the court's approval.
120
In theory the United States Trustee shall monitor and supervise all reorganization
cases However, due to a heavy case load and budgetary constraints the reality is
somewhat different and creditors, therefore, should not rely too much on the monitoring
of the United States Trustee Rather the monitoring and supervision of the debtor should
be conducted through the creditors' committee
121
116
See United States Trustee, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986. Pub L. No. 99-554 (1986)
Prior to the enactment in 1986. a pilot program had been in effect in 18 judicial districts.
The United States Trustee is a federal government official appointed by the Attorney General for a five
year term See 28 U.S.C. sees 581 and 586 (1994)
118
The United States Trustee has authority to move for the dismissal or conversion of a chapter 1 1 case if
the debtor in possession fails to timely file various schedules and statements with the bankruptcy court
See 11 U.S.C. sec. 1112(e) (1994)
119
See 11 U.S.C. sec. 1102 (a) (1) (1994).
120





The appointment by the United States Trustee of a committee of creditors holding
unsecured claims is mandatory' in all chapter 11 cases
1" In addition to the unsecured
creditors committee, the United States Trustee may appoint additional committees of
creditors or of equity security holders.
12
'' The committees ordinarily consist of persons
willing to serve, representing the seven largest holders of claims or equity interests of the
kind represented by the committee in question
124
The United States Trustee is afforded a
broad latitude in the appointment of the committees and the seven largest holders of
claims or equity interests have no right to serve on the committee if the United States
Trustee has otherwise appointed a representative committee
125
The principal role of the committees is to speak and negotiate for the larger groups
which the committees represent They consult with the debtor in possession or the trustee
concerning the administration of the case, investigate the debtor's financial conditions and
participate in the formulation of a plan of reorganization.
1 6
In addition hereto, the
committees, as parties in interest, can request the appointment of a trustee or an
examiner
127
and most courts have acknowledged that the committees under section
n2
See 11 U.S.C. sec. 1102 (a) (1) (1994)
Id. The United States Trustee can appoint such additional committees if he or she deems it
appropriate Also, parties in interest can request appointment of additional committees Id. Additional
committees should be appointed if necessary to provide adequate representation of such additional
interests However, the decision to appoint additional committees is frequently carried by more practical
considerations, i.e. whether the estate can afford to pay the substantial expenses to legal representation
obtained by the committees
124
See 1 1 U.S.C. sec. 1 102 (b) (1994).
125
See In re Featherworks. 25 BR. 634. 644 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1982), aff d. 36 BR 460 (E.D.N. Y. 1984).
126
See 11 U.SC sec. 1103 (c) (l)-(3) (1994).
12 " See 11 U.S.C. sec. 1 103 (c) (4) (1994).
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1103(c)(5) with court approval have authority to recover preferences or fraudulent
conveyances where the debtor in possession or the trustee unjustifiably has failed to do
o~ 128so
In the undertaking of their duties, the committees with court approval may employ
professionals.
129
The fees of such professionals are paid out of the assets of the estate as
"administrative expenses'
1
under section 503. The fees to the professionals employed by
the committees in addition to the fees to professionals employed by the debtor in
possession or the trustee
131
are in many cases quite significant and payment of the fees
may in fact hinder a successful reorganization of the business The Bankruptcy Code does
not provide for the compensation of the committees for services performed in connection
with the reorganization However, most courts have held that the committees are entitled
to reimbursement of expenses
132
c. Appointment or Election of a Trustee
The debtor in possession operates the estate unless the circumstances warrant
appointment of a trustee under section 1 1 04 ' of the Bankruptcy Code Only a party in
interest or the United States Trustee can request the appointment of a trustee and a
128
See In re Prime Motor Inns. Inc.. 135 BR. 917. 919 (Bankr S.D Fla.1992). See infra Part II C 4c
129
See 11 USC sec 328(1994)
130
See 11 USC. sec. 330 (a) (1994).
131
.See 11 USC. sec. 327(1994).
132
See In re J.E Jennings. Inc . 96 BR. 500 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
33
See supra Part II.C.3. Appointment of a trustee is extraordinary and a strong presumption in favor of
the debtor in possession exists absent a showing of need for a trustee See In the Matter of Macon
Prestressed Concrete Co.. 61 BR. 432. 439 (Bankr MDGa. 1986).
25
trustee is appointed only after notice and a hearing If the bankruptcy court orders the
appointment to be made, the United States Trustee appoints the trustee subject to the
court's approval However, upon the request of a party in interest, made not later than 30
days after the court's order of appointment, a creditors meeting shall be convened with
the purpose of electing a trustee.
According to section 1104(a)(1) and (a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, two separate
bases support the appointment of trustee First, under section 1 104(a)(2) a trustee should
be appointed for "cause" The Bankruptcy Code defines cause to include "fraud,
dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement of the affairs of the debtor by current
management, either before or after the commencement of the case, or similar cause".
The courts have not clearly defined what is considered sufficient "cause" for appointment
of a trustee and in particular the meaning of the term "gross mismanagement" has been the
subject of dispute in a number of cases The problem is that in most cases some form of
mismanagement has occurred prior to the filing of the petition and appointment of a
trustee based on the mere mismanagement would, therefore, defeat the philosophy of
chapter 1 1 of giving the debtor a second chance ' Thus, in most cases a trustee is
appointed only where other types of misconduct have occurred, e.g. failure to comply
with the United States Trustee's guidelines,
1 ' 8
failure to file operative statements and
'" See 11 U.S.C. sec 1104 (a) (1994) The bankruptcy court is not a party in interest and the court
therefore has no authority sua sponte to order appointment of a trustee See Cournoyer v. Town of
Lincoln. 53 BR. 478 (D.R.I. 1985). affd. 790 F 2d 971 (1st Cir 1986) But see In re Landscaping
Services. Inc.. 39 BR 588 (BankrE D.N C. 1984) where it was held that the court itself may initiate a
request for appointment
135
See 11 U.S.C. sec. 1104 (b) (1994)
136
See 11 U.S.C. sec. 1104 (a) (2) (1994).
13 " See Committee of Dalkon Shield Claimaints v. AH. Robins Co.. 828 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1987).
138




or failure to obtain permission for transfer of estate
140
assets.
Second, under section 1 104(a)(2) a trustee should be appointed 'if such appointment
is in the interests of creditors, any equity holders, and other interests of the estate".
Section 1104(a)(2) is a separate alternative standard for appointing a trustee, however,
the courts rarely order appointment of a trustee where no section 1 104(a)( 1 ) elements are
found
141
With the appointment of a trustee, the trustee takes over possession of the estate and
the rights to operate the business, enter into contracts on behalf of the estate, commence
actions to recover assets etc rest with the trustee
142
Similar to the management of a
business outside of bankruptcy , the trustee is granted some leeway to operate the business
under the business judgment rule
14 ''
The trustee has the same duties as the debtor in possession
144
In addition hereto,
section 1106 of the Bankruptcy Code places on the trustee the duty to initiate certain
investigations and inquiries, and to report the results of such investigations and inquiries
to the committees
139
See In re Pittman, 58 BR. 502 (Bankr. S.D.Tex. 1986).
' 40
See In re Ford. 36 BR 501 (Bankr W.D.Ky. 1983).
11
In re Concord Coal Corp . 11 BR. 552 (Bankr SDW.Va. 1981) is an example of a case where section
1 104(a)(2) was the sole ground for appointment of a trustee In this case the court found substantial doubt
about management" s loyalty to rehabilitation and ability to obtain confidence of secured creditors and
lenders. Id., at 554-555
142
See 11 U.S.C sec. 1108(1994).
143
See In re Curlew Valley Assocs.. 14 BR 506 (Bankr.D.Utah 1981) "[T]he court will not entertain
objections to a trustee's conduct of the estate where that conduct involves a business judgment made in
good faith, upon a reasonable basis, and within the scope of the authority under the Code". Id., at 513-
514
144
See supra Part I.C 2.
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The appointment of the trustee may be terminated and the debtor in possession may
be reinstated at any time before confirmation of the plan on the request of a party in
interest or the United States Trustee
145
Section 1 105 is rarely used but termination may
be appropriate where the circumstances which led to the appointment have changed In
Curlew Valley Assocs.
146
a trustee had been appointed because of poor legal advice and
the hiring of new counsel, combined with the stated intention of the principals of the
debtor to comply with the requirements of the Bankruptcy Code, rendered the continued
services of a trustee unnecessary.
d. Appointment of an Examiner
Where the purpose of appointing a trustee would be to have the trustee to conduct
certain investigations, the bankruptcy court may instead appoint an examiner under
section 1106(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. An examiner should be ordered, upon request of
a party in interest or the United States Trustee, where it is in the interests of creditors,
equity security holders, and other interests of the estate
148
Also, upon request an
examiner should be appointed where the debtor's fixed liquidated, unsecured debts, other
than debts for goods, services, or taxes, or owing to an insider, exceed $5,000,000
145
See 11 U.S.C sec. 1105(1994).
146
See supra note 145.
147 M, at 515.
148
See 11 U.S.C. sec. 1104 (b) (1) (1994).
149
See 11 U.S.C. sec. 1104 (b) (2) (1994) Where the aggregate amount of indebtedness is met.
appointment of an examiner would seem mandatory if requested. However, some courts have held that an
examiner should not be appointed unless some useful purpose would be served. See In re Shelter
Resources Corp.. 35 BR. 304 (Bankr N.D.Ohio 1983).
28
The function of the examiner is to investigate the debtor's acts, conduct, assets,
liabilities, operation of the business and financially condition, and any other matters
relevant to the case
l
° The examiner does not take possession of the estate and the
examiner cannot initiate actions to recover assets Thus, the examiner can be described as
a flexible and less expensive hybrid of the trustee
4. Effects of the Filing of the Chapter 11 Petition
The filing of a petition under chapter 1 1 is often referred to as "the debtor seeking
protection or relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code'
1
The term "protection" in
this context normally refers to protection against outside interference by creditors under
nonbankruptcy law.
151
In addition to the protection against outside interference, the
Bankruptcy Code empowers the trustee or the debtor in possession with certain remedies
which enhance the possibility of reorganizing the business.
152
a. Automatic Stay
Probably, the most important protection in the Bankruptcy Code from outside
interference is the automatic stay provision in section 362. This section commands that
all collection efforts
154
based on prepetition debt should cease upon the filing of the
l
-°See 11 U.S.C. sec. 1106(a)(3) (1994).
151
See infra Part II.CAa.
2
See infra Part II C.4.a and b where some of the most significant remedies are described
>3 The stay is "automatic" because it applies in any case without any request or order.
' The activities that are stayed are described in the eight subparts of section 362 (a) and include e.g.
commencement or continuation of actions; enforcement of judgments: creation, perfection, or
enforcement of liens; and setoff of debts owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the
29
petition in order to give the debtor a breathing spell from its creditors to attempt a
reorganization plan.
The bankruptcy court shall grant relief from the automatic stay, at the request of a
party in interest, if the one of the three grounds provided for in section 362(d) exists.
First, under section 362(d)(1) relief shall be granted for "cause" The most common
"causes" for relief are lack of so-called "adequate protection"
157
, or lack of good faith in
the filing of the petition.
158
Second, under section 362(d)(2) relief shall be granted if
certain property of the estate is not necessary to an effective reorganization, and if the
debtor has no equity in such property, i.e there is no excess value to which the debtor or
unsecured creditors could look. Finally, section 362(d)(3) contains a narrow ground for
relief applicable only in the so-called "single asset real estate" cases.
The creditors' rights are not extinguished by the stay, but the enforcement of them is
delayed.
159
The automatic stay operates until the plan has been confirmed
160
at which time
case The scope of the automatic stay is very wide and with the stay of "any act to collect, assess or
recover a claim" in section 362(a)(6) even a polite request to the debtor for voluntary payment is stayed
155
See H.R. Rep. No. 595. 95th Cong.. 1st Sess. 340. reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong & Admin. News
5963. 6296-97
36
See 11 U.S.C. sec. 362 (d) (1994) Creditors, especially secured creditors, almost routinely request the
automatic stay lifted and the number of cases decided under section 362(d) each year are therefore quite
substantial.
13
The term "adequate protection" refers to the safeguarding of a third party's interest in property
affected by the stay Normally, the issue of adequate protection occurs in the context of preserving the
value of a secured creditor's lien. i.e. presemng the value of the underlying assets to which the lien is
attached This is important because the stay is not supposed to shrink the value of a lien If a lien shrinks,
the creditor is entitled to adequate protection in accordance with section 361 of the Bankruptcy Code
158
If the petition is not filed in good faith, the party in interest might also move for the dismissal of the
entire case.
15
This does not necessarily mean that a creditor's rights remain unchanged. Other provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code may alter the creditors' rights For example, a lien may be avoided under section 547.
or a claim may be discharged under section 1 141(d)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code
30
the creditors' claims, either awake in the form which the plan has left them, or are
discharged under section 1141 of the Bankruptcy Code
Actions which violate the automatic stay are void, and where individuals are injured
by a willful violation of the stay, such party shall recover damages including cost and
attorney's fees.
161
In addition hereto, in some circumstances the injured may also recover
punitive damages.
162
b. Assumption or Rejection of Executory Contracts
Another important effect of the filing of the chapter 1 1 petition, is the right of the
trustee or debtor in possession under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code to assume or
reject
16,
executory contracts and unexpired leases
164
This allows the estate to select those
contracts and leases which are beneficial to the estate and to get rid of those that are
unbeneficial
Generally, the trustee or the debtor in possession may assume or reject any executory
contract or unexpired lease
165
However, over the years substantial limitations in the
160
See 1 1 U.S.C. sec. 362 (c) (1994)
161
See 1 1 U.SC. sec. 362 (h) (1994)
]62
Id
33 A third option is the right of the trustee or debtor in possession to assign a contract or unexpired lease
under section 365 (c) and (f) Subject to certain restrictions these provisions allow assignment of contracts
and leases with the effect that the contracting party can look only to the assignee.
A contract is "executory" only if the obligations "of both the bankrupt and the other parts to the
contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance would constitute a
material breach excusing performance of the other". See Countryman. Contracts in Bankruptcy. 57
Minn L.Rev . 439. 460 (1973).
165
See 1 1 U.S.C. sec. 365 (a) (1994)
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estate's right to reject certain contracts and leases have been enacted, and section 365 is in
its present form a very complex provision
If a contract or a lease is assumed it continues as property of the estate and the
obligations under the contract or lease become obligations of the estate with
administrative expense priority under section 507(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code If there
has already been a default, the trustee or debtor in possession must cure such default,
compensate the other party for any pecuniary losses, and provide adequate assurance of
future performance
167
In other words, when a contract or a lease is assumed all
prepetition obligations must be paid as administrative expenses
Rejection of a contract or lease constitutes a breach of such contract or lease and
entitles the other party to damages
168
However, such claim is deemed to have occurred
prior to the filing of the petition and the claim is therefore a general unsecured claim
c. Avoiding Powers
The trustee or the debtor in possession in a reorganization case under chapter 1 1 is
empowered with the same avoiding powers as the trustee in a chapter 7 liquidation case
The creditors, however, may not always share the view of especially the debtor in
possession on when the avoiding powers should be used Nevertheless, neither individual
creditors, nor creditors acting collectively through a creditors
1
committee generally are
empowered with avoiding powers under the Bankruptcy Code
169
Instead an unsatisfied
creditor may move to dismiss the chapter 1 1 case, seek to convert the case to a chapter 7
6
The many changes of section 365 are mainly the result of political pressure by interest groups in
Congress
16~
See 11U.S.C. sec 365 (b)(1) (1994).
168
See 1 1 USC. sec. 365 (g) (1994).
169
See Nebraska State Bank v. Jones. 846 F 2d 477 (8th Cir 1988)
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liquidation case, move to have a trustee appointed, or file a petition with the court to
compel the debtor in possession to act.' ° Alternatively, the court may allow a creditor or
a creditors' committee to institute an avoidance action
5. The Plan of Reorganization and Treatment of Claims
The breathing spell provided for by the automatic stay allows the debtor time to
pursue the ultimate goal of the reorganization, i.e. to formulate a plan which can be
confirmed by the bankruptcy court '
2
The plan itself primarily determines how the
debtor's estate shall be distributed among the various holders of claims and interests
Therefore, prior to the formulation of the plan the nature and the amount of the claims
and interests must be determined
a. Determining Claims Against the Estate
Included in the plan are allowed claims
1
' against the estate The claims must be listed
on the debtor's schedule of liabilities which the trustee or debtor in possession files with




Id. Under the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec 186. subsec. 3. individual creditors are entitled to file
actions to set aside avoidable preferences or transfers if the estate decides not to pursue a claim See supra
Part II B 2.
c
172
See 11 U.S.C. sec 1129(1994)
3
The term "claims" is defined in section 101(5)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code as "right to payment,
whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured,
disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured" In addition hereto, certain equitable
remedies are considered claims against the estate See 1 1 U.S.C. sec. 101 (5) (B) (1994).
]14




If a claim is not listed on the schedule, or is listed as
disputed, contingent, or unliquidated, the creditor must file a proof of claim
17°
Because of the automatic stay, disputed claims cannot be resolved outside of the
bankruptcy proceeding Instead such claims, and contingent or unliquidated claims, are
determined by resolution of the bankruptcy court The bankruptcy court can determine the
claims on the merits, it can estimate the claims in accordance with section 502(c) of the
Bankruptcy Code, or it can temporarily allow the claims ' In the latter case, the claims
are only allowed for the purpose of voting and must afterwards for purpose of distribution
be determined, either on the merits or by estimation Estimation of claims are necessary
where a decision on the merits would cause an undue delay of the proceeding
17
b. Contents of the Plan
Once the various claims have been determined, the debtor can begin structuring the
claims into a plan of reorganization Section 1123 of the Bankruptcy Code lists the
requirements to the contents of the plan and among other things calls for the plan to
divide claims and interests into classes . The claims and interests in each class must be
175
See Bankruptcy Rule 3003 (b)(1).
76
See Bankruptcy Rule 3003 (c) (2). If a claim is not included in the schedule or proof of a claim is not
timely filed, the claim is disallowed and the holder of such claim shall not be treated as a creditor for
purposes of voting and distribution. Id.
] " See Bankruptcy Rule 3018 (a).
3
This is particularly relevant in mass tort cases where there may be hundreds or even thousands of
individual claims. See In re UNR Industries. Inc.. 45 BR. 322 (Bankr.N.D 111.1985) where some 17.000
claims had been filed
1-9




If there are classes of claims or interests that are not impaired
181
under the plan such classes must specified.
Because the creditors and holders of interests vote to accept or reject the plan in
classes, the classification of claims into impaired an unimpaired classes
18
' may determine
whether the plan can be confirmed .
4
Furthermore, by splitting similar claims, especially
unsecured claims, into different classes, it may in effect be possible for the debtor to
nullify the vote of some dissenting creditors
185
After the claims have been divided into classes, the plan must specify the treatment of
impaired claims.
186
Unless the holder of a claim or interest has agreed to a less favorable
treatment, the plan must provide for the same treatment for all claims and interests in each
180
See 11 U.S.C. sec. 1122 (a) (1994).
181 A class of claims or interests is impaired, unless the plan leaves the rights of such claim or interest
holders unaltered, or where a default has incurred cures the default, reinstates the maturity of the claim,




See 11 U.S.C. sec. 1 123 (a) (2) (1994).
183
Only impaired creditors may vote on the plan. See 1 1 U.S.C sec. 1 126 (f) (1994).
184
See infra Part II.C.6.d
185
Section 1122(a) of the Bankruptcy Code ensures that dissimilar claims are not placed in the same
class However, section 1122(a) does not expressly require the debtor to place similar claims in a single
class Section 1122(b) allows the plan to designate a separate class consisting of only unsecured claims
that are less than or reduced to a certain amount. The question is. however, whether section 1122(b)
should be regarded an exception to a general rule requiring similar claims placed in a single class, or
whether section 1122(b) merely is an example of the use of multiple classes of similar claims Some
courts have held that except for the small claims mentioned in section 1122(b). similar claims should be
placed in a single class. See e.g. In re Fantastic Homes Enterprises. Inc.. 44 BR 999 (M D.Fla. 1984).
But see Riesenfield. Classification of Claims and Interests in Chapter 11 and 13 Cases. 75 Calif.L.Rev.
391. 401 (1987) Professor Riesenfield suggests that similar claims can be placed in different classes as
long as the treatment is not "unfairly discriminatory".
185




The treatment of the various classes under the plan depends on the nature of the
claims or interests included in the particular class Finally, the plan must provide adequate
means for the implementation of the plan.
188
c. Filing of the Plan and Period of Exclusivity
In order to be able to draft a plan which is likely to be accepted by an adequate
number of creditors, the debtor will negotiate the contents of the plan with the creditors
prior to the filing
189
The debtor is granted a period of exclusivity of 120 days after the
filing of the petition in which only the debtor can file a plan.
190
If the debtor fails to file a
plan before 120 days, or if the debtor fails to obtain acceptances from all impaired
creditors before 1 80 days after the filing of the petition, any party in interest may file a
plan.
191
Also, parties in interest may file a plan if the debtor is no longer in possession of
the estate, i.e. a trustee has been appointed.
192
181
See 11 U.S.C. sec. 1123 (a) (4) (1994)
188
.See 11 U.S.C. sec. 1123 (a) (5) (1994).
Depending on the nature of the case, the negotiations may take a substantial period of time. In
Manville Corp v. Equity Security Holders Committee (In re Johns-Mam llle Corp.. 801 F.2d 60 (2nd
Cir. 1986) the debtor negotiated almost 4 years with the various committees to draft a plan.
190
.See 11 U.S.C. sec. 1121(b) (1994)
" .See 11 U.S.C. sec. 1121 (c) (1994). At the request of a party in interest, the court may reduce or
increase the above mentioned 120-day period and 180-day period The court can make such decision "for
cause". .See 11 U.S.C. sec 1121 (d) (1994)
192
.See 11 U.S.C. sec. 1121 (C) (1) (1994).
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6. Voting on and Confirmation of the Plan
The next step after the filing of the plan is for the creditors and interest holders to
vote to accept or reject the plan However, before the creditors and interest holders can
vote on the plan, they need to be provided with certain information about the plan and the
debtor's financial situation
a. Disclosure Statements
The information necessary for the creditors to make an informed decision about the
plan is provided by means of a disclosure statement . Before the disclosure statement is
circulated, it must be approved by the court after notice and a hearing The court shall
approve the disclosure statement if it contains adequate information.
194
Once the disclosure statement has been approved it is mailed to the creditors and
interest holders.
195
At the same time the plan, or a summary of the plan approved by the
court, a ballot for purpose of voting, and information concerning the time fixed for filing
193
See 11 U.S.C. sec. 1125 (b) (1994) If necessary to provide adequate information, the court may
approve different disclosure statements as between classes See 1 1 U.S.C. sec 1 125 (c) (1994)
1
The term 'adequate information"' is defined in section 1125(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code In a case
out of the southern district of Ohio. In re Scioto Valley Mortgage Co.. 88 BR 168 (Bankr.S. D.Ohio
1988). the court listed 19 disclosures which typically should be included in a disclosure statement The
list included e.g. the circumstances that gave rise to the filing of the bankruptcy petition, description of
the debtor's assets and claims filed, anticipated future of the debtor, liquidation analysis, accounting and
valuation methods used in the statement, information about management, amount of administrative
expenses incurred, existence of avoidable transfers, and ongoing or planned litigation etc. Id at 171
195
The court may order that the disclosure statement and the additional material shall not be mailed to
unimpaired classes See Bankruptcy Rule 3017 (d).
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acceptances and objections, and the time for the hearing on confirmation shall be mailed
to the creditors and interest holders.
196
b. Solicitation of Acceptances and Rejections
Prior to the voting on the plan, the creditors and interest holders may be advised
about how they should vote Thus, supporters of the plan may solicit acceptances and
opponents may solicit rejections in an attempt to sway the votes According to section
1125(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, acceptances or rejections of the plan must not be
solicited in the period from the date of the filing of the petition to the date where the
disclosure statement and the plan is received by the creditors and interest holders
It is not unusual that a plan of reorganization is negotiated and solicited prior to the
filing of the petition and thereafter is presented to the court as a package The use of such
prepackaged plans reduce the costs and the delay of the traditional chapter 1 1 proceeding
and it is, therefore, a procedure accepted by the courts
197
However, the prepetition
solicitations must comply with the disclosure requirements in the Bankruptcy Code and
acceptances of the plan obtained prepetition must have been obtained in compliance with
any applicable nonbankruptcy law or regulation, or where no such law or regulation exists




See Bankruptcy Rule 3017 (d).
9
See Kirschner. et al.. Prepackaged Bankruptcy Plans The Deleveraging Tool of the 90s in the Wake
of OID and Tax Concerns. 21 Seton Hall L Rev. 643. 661-62 (1991)
198
See Bankruptcy Rule 3018(b) See also NICHOLAS P SAGGESE & ALESIA RANNEY-
MARINELLI. A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO OUT-OF-COURT RESTRUCTURINGS AND
PREPACKAGED PLANS OF REORGANIZATION. 4-15 (1991).
c. The Voting Procedure
The voting on the plan is done by filling out and returning the ballot which was sent to
the creditors and interest holders with the disclosure statement and summary of the
plan .'" In order to vote on the plan, the creditor or interest holder must have an allowed
claim or interest.
200
Furthermore, only classes that are impaired are eligible to vote on the
plan
201
Under section 1 126(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, the court, after notice and a hearing,
may invalidate the vote of a creditor or interest holder if such vote was not in good faith
Lack of good faith was defined in In re Federal Support Co.
202
as an ulterior or coercive
motive of pure malice, blackmail, or an effort to destroy a competing business
The votes are counted in each class. A class of claims is considered to have accepted
the plan if it is accepted by at least two-thirds in amount and more than one-half in number
of the allowed claims. A class of interests is considered to have accepted the plan if it is
accepted by interest holders which represent at least two-thirds of the amount of the
199
See Bankruptcy Rule 3018 (c) which requires the acceptance or rejection to be in writing and signed.
J0
See 11 U.S.C. sec. 1 126 (a) (1994) A claim is deemed allowed if it has been filed and there has been
no objection to it. See 11 U.S.C. sec. 502 (a) (1994) A claim can be allowed in the amount in which it is
filed, it can be temporarily allowed for voting purposes, or it can be estimated by the court. See 1 1 U.S.C.
sec. 502 (c) (1994). See also supra Part II.C.5.a.
201
See 11 U.S.C. sec 1126 (f) (1994). Administrative claims must be paid in full under section
1129(a)(9)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code Holders of such claims are not impaired and are therefore not
eligible to vote on the plan
202
In re Federal Support Co.. 859 F.2d 17 (4th Cir.1988).
203




Both the two-thirds and the one-half requirements are calculated on
the basis of the total amount or number of claims or interests which actually have voted.
20
d. Confirmation of the Plan
Before the plan of reorganization can come into effect, it must be confirmed by the
bankruptcy court If the plan is accepted by all impaired classes, the plan is confirmed
consensually If one or more classes fail to accept the plan it may, however, still be
possible to confirm the plan non-consensually in a so-called "cramdown"
The plan is confirmed in a hearing where parties in interest may object to the
confirmation of the plan Parties in interest in this context have generally been defined as
parties whose rights will be affected by confirmation of the plan.
206
i. Consensual Confirmation
Section 1 129(a) of the Bankruptcy Code lists thirteen requirements which a plan must
meet for the court to confirm it Approximately half of the requirements listed are so-
called "boiler plate" requirements which seldom form the basis for an objection
207 Of the
remaining requirements, the so-called "best interest" test in section 1129(a)(7) should be
emphasized This test requires that any impaired creditor or interest holder must either
agree to the plan, or receive not less value than the holder would receive if the debtor was
204
See 11 U.S.C. sec. 1126 (d) (1994)
205
See In re Gilbert. 104 BR. 206 (Bankr WD Mo 1989).
206
See Wonder Corp of America. 70 BR 1018, 1022 (Bankr D. Conn 1987). unimpaired classes not
entitled to object: and In re Cheatham. 78 BR. 104 (Bankr.E.D.N.C.1987). affd. 91 BR 377
(E.D.N C. 1988). administrative claimants not entitled to object
The boiler plate requirements include section 1 129(a)(1). (2), (3). (4), (5). (6). and (13).
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liquidated under chapter 7, The best interest test protects the rights of a dissenting
creditor, rather than the rights of a dissenting class The rights of the latter is protected
under the rules concerning cramdown confirmation
208
Also, the requirements under section 1129(a)(9) should be emphasized This part of
section 1129 set forth the requirements for the treatment of administrative claims and
unsecured priority claims Under section 1129(a)(9)(A) administrative claims and so-
called "involuntary gap claims"
2 9
must be paid cash in full on the effective date of the
reorganization, unless the holders of such claims have agreed to a different treatment
Section 1129(a)(9)(B) requires that a specified list of classes of other unsecured priority
claims must either be paid cash in full if the class rejects the plan, or if the class accepts
the plan, must be paid deferred cash payments of a value equal to the allowed amount of
such claims as of the effective date of the plan
Finally, in order for the court to confirm the plan consensually, the court must find




Where the requirement of section 1 129(a)(8), i.e. all impaired classes accept the plan
is not satisfied, the court can confirm the plan only if the requirements of section 1 129(b)
are satisfied.
211
According to this part of section 1 129 the plan must, first, satisfy all the
requirements of section 1129(a) excluding paragraph (8), i.e the plan must satisfy all the
208
See infra Part II.C.6.d ii
209
See 1 1 U.S.C. sec 507 (a) (2) (1994).
:1
" See 1 1 U.SC. sec. 1 129 (a) (11) (1994). This requirement is called the "feasibility" test.
"" Confirmation under section 1129(b) requires a request from a proponent of the plan See 11 U.S.C.
sec. 1129 (b)(1) (1994).
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requirements to a concensual confirmation, except the requirement that all classes voted
919
to accept the plan.
Second, the plan must not discriminate unfairly against dissenting classes.
21
Generally, this paragraph requires that similar situated classes should receive
approximately the same percentage of their claims and it would be to discriminate unfairly
if for example trade creditors received a better treatment than other unsecured
creditors
Finally, the plan must be fair and equitable with respect to dissenting classes In
section 1129(b)(2) this requirement is specified with respect to classes of secured claims,
classes of unsecured claims, and classes of interests.
215
Section 1 129(b)(2) include the so-
called "absolute priority
,,
rule which ensures that the claims or interests of a dissenting
class of unsecured creditors must be fully satisfied before any junior class may retain any
property under the reorganization plan
216
7. Effects of the Confirmation
Once the plan of reorganization has been confirmed by the court
217
it is binding on the
debtor, the creditors, and the interest holders
218
The court's decision to confirm or reject
212
The requirement of section 1 129(a)( 10) is significant to the cramdown confirmation This paragraph
ensures that the plan will not be confirmed if not at least one class of impaired claims accepted the plan
213
See 11 U.S.C. sec. 1129 (b) (1) (1994).
:i4
See In re Eisenbarth. 77 BR. 228 (Bankr.D.N.D.1987)
215
See 11 U.S.C. sec. 1129 (b) (2) (A)-(C) (1994).
2,6
See 11 U.S.C. sec. 1129 (b) (2) (B) (ii) and (C) (n) (1994).
On the request of a party in interest filed with the court before 180 days after the date of the
confirmation, the court may after notice and a hearing revoke the confirmation order if it was procured by
fraud See 11 U.S.C sec 1144 (1994)
218
See 1 1 U.S.C. sec. 1 141 (a) (1994) which list additional entities bound by the plan
42
the plan can be appealed within 10 days of the entry of the judgment
21 " The plan will be
implemented on the effective date provided for in the plan.
22
'* On that date the cash
payments required will be made in addition to the issuing of new stock, transfer of
property, and other actions stipulated by the plan Also, once the plan is confirmed the
property of the estate is vested in the debtor,
221
and the property dealt with by the plan is
free and clear of all claims and interests of creditors, and equity security holders
22
However, the most significant effect of the confirmation is probably the discharge
provided for in section 1141(d) of the Bankruptcy Code According to this section, any
debt that arose prior to the date of the confirmation is discharged, and all rights and
interests of equity security holders are terminated
223
If the confirmation order is revoked
under section 1 144 of the Bankruptcy Code, the discharge is revoked too
224
D. Conclusion of Resemblances and Differences
The ultimate purpose of the reorganization procedures in both Denmark and in the
United States are the same, i.e. for the debtor to propose a confirmable plan which the
creditors will vote to accept In the administration of the cases, both systems have the
concept of a debtor in possession,
225
creditor participation in the form of a creditors'
committee, and a bankruptcy court which settles disputes and confirms the plan
219
See Bankruptcy Rule 8002 (a)
220
See 11 U.S.C. sec. 1142(1994)
221
See 11 U.SC. sec. 1141 (b) (1994)
222
See 11 U.S.C. sec. 1141 (c) (1994).
The discharge in section 1141(d) makes the definition of claims against the estate essential to the
reorganization proceeding See supra Part II C.5 a
224
See 11 U.S.C. sec 1 144 (2) (1994).
^ Under the Danish Bankruptcy Act the term "debtor in possession'" simply means that the debtor
remains in possession of the estate The Danish Bankruptcy Act does not impose 'trustee rights and
duties" on the debtor in possession
"
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Furthermore, both systems operate an automatic stay and provide for avoiding powers
Finally, once a plan or proposal has been confirmed, the debtor is liable only to the
obligations under the plan and any unpaid debts are discharged
.
In spite of the above resemblances, a closer examination of the proceedings reveal
many differences.
227
First, the proceedings under the two systems are different in that way
that the Danish system provides for a separate proceeding to prepare the reorganization
plan, i.e. the suspension of payments proceeding" Chapter 11 provides for only one
proceeding which continues until the plan has been confirmed, or the case has been
converted or dismissed
Second, reorganization under the rules of compulsory composition includes only
unsecured non-priority claims
229 A reorganization plan under chapter 1 1 may adjust not
only unsecured claims but also secured claims, and stock interests.
230
Thus, reorganization
under chapter 1 1 not only reschedules debt, it usually provides for a substantial change in
the ownership of the business
231
Third, although the debtor remains in possession under both systems, the debtor in
possession under chapter 1 1 is allowed much more room to operate the business than the
debtor in suspension of payments under the Danish Bankruptcy Act
26
Only claims and interests that are included in the plan or proposal are disharged Claims and interests
that are not included in plan. e.g. priority claims, are not discharged.
Some of the diffences in the proceedings can be explained by the fundamental differences in the
bankruptcy policies of Denmark and the United States. Especially a more "debtor friendly" approach to
bankruptcy can be found in many of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code
" 8
Once the plan. i.e. the composition proposal, is prepared, the proposal is negotiated and voted on in a
separate composition proceeding. See supra Part II.B.2.C.
229
See supra Part II.B.2.a.
30
See supra Part Il.C.S.b Not included in the plan is certain priority claims under section 507(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code
11
With the confirmation of the plan, the property of the debtor is free and clear of "old*" equity interests
The plan will provide for issuance and distribution of new stocks Usually, unsecured creditors will
receive stocks in the reorganized business as part of their payment. See 11 US C. sec 1141(c) (1994).
44
Fourth, under the Danish Bankruptcy Act, the debtor is granted total exclusivity to
commence the reorganization proceeding, and to file a composition proposal Under
chapter 1 1, the debtor's exclusivity is limited to the filing of the plan.
2
Finally, the voting procedures and the rules on confirmation are substantially
different.
3
' The most significant difference is that the Danish system has a minimum
payment requirement Chapter 1 1 has no minimum payment requirement Instead the plan
must satisfy several tests described in the Code
" 4
2
Furthermore, the exclusmty is limited to 120 days, unless the court has extended the period of
exclusivity. See 11 U.S.C. sec. 1121 (b) and (c) (1994)
3
The voting and confirmation procedures reflect the nature of the claims and interests included in the
two procedures Because the Danish composition proposal includes only one class of claims with the same
priority, the rules governing confirmation of the composition proposal are simpler than the rules
governing confirmation of a chapter 1 1 plan.
234
See 11 U.S.C. sec 1129(1994).
III. Statistics on Reorganization
A. Introduction
When the Bankruptcy Committee in their Reorganization Report concluded that a
reform of the Danish rules on reorganization was required, it did so on the basis of
information from the Central Bureau of Statistics." the Employees" Guarantee Fund/"
the Bankruptcy Branch of the Maritime and Commercial Court." and an inquiry
instituted among Danish bankruptcy lawyers " * The principal source of information on
5
The Central Bureau of Statistics [Danmarks Statistik] is the official Bureau of statistics in Denmark
Since 1896 the Bureau has published its annual Statisucal Yearbook which contains information about
the social and economic conditions in Denmark
The Employees' Guarantee Fund is an employer funded institution The Fund guarantees payment to
employees of lnsobent employers up to a maximum of DKK 75.000 [S 12.000] Usually the Fund will pay
the salaries to the employees shortly after bankruptcy has been declared Upon payment the Fund
subrogates into the rights of the individual employees See lovbekendigorelse nr 77 af 12 februar 1988
[Act no 77 of 12 February 19881
The Bankruptcy Branch of the Maritime and Commercial Court is venue for the disrnct of
Copenhagen and a number of district surrounding Copenhagen See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec 4 In
addition hereto, a debtor can elect the Bankruptcy Branch of the Maritime and Commercial Court as
venue if the case requires special business expertise on the Bench See the Danish Administration of
Justice Act sec 9. subsec 3, no 5
This inquiry. y\hich was made in the beginning of 1994. is hereinafter referred to as the
"Reorganization Inquiry" Eighteen bankruptcy lawyers returned the questionnaire thereby proytding a
population of 160 reorganization cases
45
46
bankruptcy statistics in the United States is the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts
239
B. Statistics on Liquidation Proceedings
In Table 1, the total number of bankruptcy filings in the United States and the number
of cases filed under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code are compared with the number of




















Where no other source of information is specified, the source to the following statistical information on
bankruptcy proceedings in the United States is the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
However, reference is made to two 1996 articles on reorganization: Lisa Hill Fenmng and Craig A Hart.
Measuring Chapter 1 1: The Real World of 500 Cases. 4 Am Bankr Inst L Rev 1 19 (1996) (hereinafter
referred to as the "Fenmng & Hart") and Hon Samuel L Bufford. Chapter 11 Case Management and
Delay Reduction: An Empirical Study. 4 Am Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 85 (1996) (hereinafter referred to as
"Bufford"). A major but not yet published study of chapter 1 1 cases is expected within the next couple of
years. See for an explanation of scope and methods of study Elisabeth Warren and Jay L Westbrook,
Searching for Reorganization Realities. 72 Wash. U L. Q. 1257 (1994).
240
Four different proceedings exist under the Damsh Bankruptcy Act. i.e. liquidation proceedings,
suspension of payments proceedings, compulsory composition proceedings, and debt rescheduling
proceedings
" See Statistical Yearbook 1992-1995. Statistics showing the total number of filings under the Danish
Bankruptcy Act. i.e. petitions for suspension of payments, compulsory composition, debt rescheduling,











Obviously, the differences in the absolute figures for Denmark and the United States
reflect the different size of the two countries
245
However, taking the size of the two
countries into account, the United States still has a substantially higher number of
liquidation filings than Denmark
246
This difference can be explained primarily by looking
at debtor demographics In the United States, proceedings under chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code are commenced not only to liquidate the estates of businesses that
failed The vast majority of cases are commenced by non-business individuals with the
purpose of having unpaid debts discharged
24
Under the Danish Bankruptcy Act, the
242
This figure shows the number of filings in the year beginning 1 October 1992 through 30 September
1993
243
This figure shows the number of filings in the year beginning 1 October 1993 through 30 September
1994.
244
The Statistical Yearbook for 1996 is not yet published.
245
The United States has approximately 252 mill inhabitants compared to Denmark's 5.2 mill.
246
The Umted States is approximately 50 times bigger than Denmark If this factor is used on the number
of liquidation filings in 1995 there should have been filed only approximately 113.000 petitions under
Chapter 7 in the United States In other words, with 626.150 cases filed under chapter 7 in 1995. the
United States has approximately 5.5 times the number of liquidation proceedings of Denmark.
4
Approximately 96 percent of all chapter 7 cases are non-business related cases. See Admin. Off. of the
U.S. Cts. Press Release 18 March 1997. The press release shows that in the last quarter of 1996. the
number of non-business cases was 204.807 out of a total of 212.301 cases under chapter 7. If the
individual debtor has a regular income, the unsecured debts are less than $250,000. and the secured debts
are less than $750,000. the debtor may file a petition under chapter 13 instead and thereby retain
possession of the property of the estate In this case any unpaid debts will generally be discharged if the
48
debtor in a liquidation proceeding does not get unpaid debts discharged, and this
proceeding, therefore, is almost never commenced voluntarily by non-business
individuals.
Table 1 shows another significant difference between the United States and Denmark
While Denmark after 1993 had a decrease in the number of bankruptcies/
49
the United
States has experienced the opposite Thus in 1996 the number of bankruptcy petitions in
the United States jumped up 27.2 percent over 1995 thereby reaching an all-time high of
1,178,555
C. Statistics on Reorganization Cases
The Danish procedure equivalent to the United States chapter 1 1 proceeding is the
compulsory composition proceeding Table 2 compares the number of chapter 1
1
petitions with the number of petitions of compulsory composition proceedings
debtor makes the instalment payments called for under the plan See 1 1 U.S.C. sec. 109(e) and Chapter
13 of the Bankruptcy Code
248
Where the debt of an individual has grown to a size where it is unlikely that the person over a
reasonable period of time will be able to repay the debt, the relevant procedure to consider is debt
rescheduling This procedure discharges debts which the debtor will not be able to repay over a penod of
typically 5 years. See Part IV of the Danish Bankruptcy Act
249
The decrease was 16 percent from 1993 to 1994 and 22 percent from 1994 to 1995. The decrease in
the number of liquidations can be explained by the positive economic conditions which Denmark has

















Contrary to the overall development in the number of bankruptcy filings, there has
been a significant decrease in the number of cases filed under chapter 1 1 Thus, over a
period of five years the number has almost been cut in half Less dramatic is the
development in the number of compulsory compositions showing a 25 percent decrease
from 1994 to 1995
While compulsory composition is exclusively for debtors engaged in business activity,
chapter 1 1 is available also for non-business debtors However, the number of non-
business individuals who file for chapter 1 1 relief is small In the last quarter of 1996 only
10 percent of the chapter 1 1 filings were categorized as non-business filings.
25
250
The percentage of non-business filings may even be lower than the 10 percent reported by the
Administrative Office In their analysis of 500 chapter 1 1 cases out of the Central District of California.
Fenning & Hart found that the Administrative Office generally understated the number of business
filings. However, the figures referred to by Fenning & Hart were collected from 1991 through 1994 and
indicated a non-business percentage of 18 percent in contrast to 28 percent reported by the Administrative
Office Improvements of the reporting system made after 1994 may have solved the problem of
categorization See Fenning & Hart, at 131-133.
50
1. Business Size
Both the chapter 1 1 proceeding and the compulsory composition proceeding are
unitary proceedings designed to fit all businesses regardless of their size However, in the
comparison of the proceedings it is essential to know the typical size of the businesses that
are sought reorganized.
251
The study made by Fenning & Hart 25 showed that in
approximately 35 percent of the cases, the debtor had assets and liabilities between
$100,000 and $1 million, and in approximately 45 percent of the cases, the debtor had
assets and liabilities between $1 and 10 million. ' On the basis of the above figures,




The size of the business is particularly relevant when the costs of the reorganization are considered
The costs involved with a chapter 1 1 proceeding are substantial and especially smaller businesses may be
precluded from reorganization because of the amount of expenses. See Hon A Thomas Small. Small
Business Bankruptcy Cases. 1 Am Bankr Inst L Rev 305 (1993). See also David A. Skell. Jr . Markets.
Courts, and the Brave New World of Bankruptcy Theory. 1993 Wis L Rev 465 Skell's study shows that
the cost of chapter 1 1 are approximately 3 percent of the asset value for large corporations and in excess
of 10 percent for smaller entrepnses. Id., at 512.
:
The Administrative Office of the United States Courts also collects statistics on the size of the debtor
However, according to Fenning & Hart, there have been significant errors in these statistics because of
inaccuracy in the debtors' response to the question of amount of assets and liabilities Apparently, one of
the problems has been that the debtors did not realize that the checkboxes in which the amount of assets
and liabilities should be stated were supposed to be in "thousands of dollars'. Obviously, this has caused




Id, at 119. Compared to Danish businesses, a business with assets and liabilities in excess of $1
million would not be considered a small business
51
In Denmark no information is available on the amount of assets and liabilities of the
businesses that are reorganized However, some indications of size may be found in the
reported number of employees In the Reorganization Inquiry the bankruptcy lawyers
replied that in approximately 25 percent of the cases, the businesses had less than 5
employees, and in another approximately 20 percent of the cases, the businesses had
between 5 and 10 employees Only in approximately 30-35 percent of the cases, the
businesses had more than 25 employees Thus, although the amount of assets and
liabilities cannot be compared, it is safe to conclude that the size of the reorganization
cases in Denmark generally is smaller than in the United States
2. Suspension of Payments Proceedings
Both out-of-court workouts and compulsory compositions under the Danish
Bankruptcy Act are typically prepared while the debtor has suspended its payments The
total number of suspension of payments filed in Denmark is not available, however, Table











With a decline in the number of suspension of payments of two-thirds over a period
of 5 years, the suspension of payments proceeding is the proceeding under the Danish
Bankruptcy Act which has the largest decrease in number Again, the decline in the
number of suspension of payments can be explained primarily by the positive economic
conditions in Denmark in the relevant period of time However, some of the decline in the
number of suspension of payments may also be explained by a general dissatisfaction with
the ability of the proceeding to carry the debtor through to a successful reorganization.
3. Statistics on the Outcome of Reorganizations
No doubt, when considering a reform of the rules on reorganization, the most
interesting question to be answered is "What is the outcome of the cases9" Neither
Denmark nor the United States systematically collects information to give a satisfactory
answer to this question.
255
Therefore, the following analysis of the reorganizations in the
United States and in Denmark is based on studies of samples of reorganization cases in the
two countries.
5
The lack of precise and reliable information is a serious problem both for the evaluation of the current
systems and for the creation and implementation of future reforms Fennmg & Hart conclude that in
addition to the more basic information such as figures on the number of filings, the number of
confirmations, and the number of days until dismissal, conversion or confirmation, an effective
information system must also provide information about the contents of the plan and certain
postconfirmation data e.g. the number of reorganization plans that actually complete all payments, the
number of reorganized debtors that are still in business two years after confirmation, and the percentage
recovery achieved by secured creditors versus unsecured creditors See Fennmg & Hart, at 156.
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a. The United States










Samuel L Bufford ( 1996)
258
16 7%
Table 4 shows that only approximately 17 percent of the cases filed under chapter 1
1
result in the confirmation of a plan What then happens to the remaining 83 percent of the
Table 5
Outcome of Chapter 1 1 Cases
2
Plans Confirmed Cases Converted Cases Dismissed
Study of 751 16 7% 35.7%
Chapter 1 1 Cases
,6 Ed Flynn of the Administrative Office of United States Courts studied 2395 chapter 11 cases out of 15
different districts The cases were filed between 1 October 1979 and 31 December 1986 The study is not
published. See Bufford. 4 Am Bankr Inst. L Rev. at 87.
This study included 260 cases filed in the Poughkeepsie division of the Southern District of New York
from 1979 to 1989. See Susan Jensen-Conklin. Do Confirmed Chapter 11 Plans Consummate7 The
Results of a Study and Analysis of the Law, 97 Comm L J 297 ( 1992).
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Normally, converted cases are converted to chapter 7 liquidation cases, and therefore
the conversion is the end of the reorganization attempt Cases that are dismissed,
however, are not necessarily unsuccessful reorganization attempts A case might be
dismissed because the parties agree to an out-of-court workout, or it might be dismissed
after completion of a sale of the estate's principal assets ,
260
b. Denmark
The Bankruptcy Committee had two sources to measure the outcome of Danish
reorganization proceedings First, the Committee asked the Maritime and Commercial
Court to report the outcome of suspension of payments cases filed with the court The
court did not and still does not have an information system which collects the requested
information and the court, therefore, had to examine each case individually The result of
the examination is shown in Table 6
Table 6
261
Outcome of Reorganization Attempts
(Maritime and Commercial Court)
Outcome of 337 cases of
Suspension of Payments
filed in 1991
Converted to a liquidation
proceeding
186(55%)





See the Reorganization Report, at 19
55
The information from the Maritime and Commercial Court does not account for the
remaining 114 (34%) of the 337 cases In these cases the suspension of payments was
terminated without an immediate conversion to another proceeding under the Danish
Bankruptcy Act. No doubt, in some of the cases the parties have agreed to some kind of
out-of-court workout.
262
The second source of information was the Reorganization Inquiry Out of a total of
160 reorganization cases, the debtor filed for suspension of payments in 114 cases The
outcome of these cases is shown in Table 7
Table 7.
263
Outcome of Reorganization Attempts
(The Reorganization Inquiry)
Converted to a Ended after a Converted to Out-of-
Liquidation sale of business Compulsory Court




Cases of 40(35%) 22(19%) 25 (22%) 23 (20%)
Suspension
of Payments
There is a significant difference in the number of conversions to liquidation
proceedings reported by the Maritime and Commercial Court and the number reported in
the Reorganization Inquiry However, there is reason to believe that the 55 percent
reported by the Maritime and Commercial Court is a more accurate figure than the 35
6
" See Table 5 The Reorganization Inquiry indicates that approximately 20 percent of the suspension of
payment cases are reorganized in some kind of out-of-court workout
263
See the Reorganization Report, at 20-24.
' A
In 4 of the cases (4%) the suspension of payments ended without any solution having been found.
56
percent reported by the bankruptcy lawyers. It is not unusual that a debtor with basically
no hope of reorganization files for suspension of payments to attempt a sale of the
business as going concern or to liquidate the estate prior to the filing of the liquidation
proceeding It is likely that some of these cases have not been regarded as reorganization
cases by the bankruptcy lawyers, and, therefore, are not included in the Reorganization
Inquiry. If this assumption is right, the exclusion of some suspension of payments cases
can also explain why the Reorganization Inquiry reports a higher percentage of cases
converted to compulsory composition proceedings.
265
4. Statistics on the Length of Reorganization Cases
The length of a reorganization case is of major concern for several reasons First,
once the business is insolvent poor investment policies may be fostered because risk and
loss are separated.
266
Second, while the owners and creditors struggle to protect their
investments and claims, substantial direct expenses in the form of professional fees will
incur. The longer the case, the higher the fees Third, insolvent businesses generally
The Reorganization Inquiry reports that 22 percent of the suspension of payments cases were
converted to compulsory composition proceedings In comparison, the Maritime and Commercial Court
found only 1 1 percent of the cases converted to compulsory composition proceedings
,6
Because of the absolute priority rule, the value of the owners" interest in an insolvent business is zero.
In other words, the owners will loose their investment unless the business can be reorganized.
Furthermore, because the owners benefit from an increase in the value of the business and do not suffer
financial losses from an additional decrease in the value, the owners are likely to favor a risk orientated
investment policy during the reorganization The investment policy pursued during the reorganization is
especially troublesome in the reorganization of smaller businesses where the owners as owner-managers
will continue the operation of the business as the debtor in possession. See Lynn M. LoPucki. The Trouble




perform poorly during the reorganization because customers and suppliers are reluctant to
do business with them on usual terms and conditions
2M
Furthermore, the management of
the insolvent business, typically spends substantial amounts of time on negotiations and
litigation, leaving less time to manage the operations Fourth, the filing of a petition for
reorganization mandates a suspension of payments which may severely disrupt the
businesses of the creditors
269
Finally, because interest does not accrue on unsecured debt
after the date of the filing of the petition, there is a transfer of wealth from unsecured
creditors to oversecured creditors during the lifetime of the reorganization case.
270
The studies of the length of chapter 1 1 cases suggest a median time to confirmation
between 17 and 22 months
271
Bankruptcy Judge Thomas Small, however, has managed to
shorten the time to confirmation significantly by using his so-called Fast Track
Program. In comparison, a study of Danish reorganization cases showed that 18.7
percent of the cases ended within the first month, 46 6 percent of the cases ended within 3
months, 69.1 percent of the cases ended within 6 months, and 82 2 percent of the cases









Id, at 739 LoPucki found a median time of 17 2 months in his study. See also Ed Flynn. supra note
256. who found a median time of 21 6 months.
2
See Bufford, 4 Am Bankr Inst L Rev . at 99 However even with the use of Small's Fast Track
Program, studies of reorganization cases prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code indicate that
chapter 1 1 proceedings are substantially longer than the proceedings used under the old Bankruptcy Act.
See LoPucki. 1993 Wis. L. Rev., at 739 While chapter 11 has not significantly added delay to large
reorganization cases. LoPucki 's studies show that chapter 1 1 has more than doubled the length of small
reorganization cases. Id. LoPucki suggests that a separate and less complex reorganization proceeding
should be created for small businesses Id., at 752.
3
See the Reorganization Report, at 20. The data was provided by the Maritime and Commercial Court
on the basis of suspension of payments cases filed in 1991 Where the suspension of payments proceeding
58
Obviously, delay is less of a problem in the Danish reorganization system than in
proceedings under chapter 1 1 However, it could be argued that the length of the two
proceedings cannot be compared because a chapter 1 1 case is more complex than a
Danish reorganization case.
274
Nevertheless, minimum delay under the Danish rules is
ensured primarily by section 16e, subsection 2 of the Danish Bankruptcy Act which limits
the length of suspension of payments to a maximum of one year. " Also, the use of so-
called prepackaged plans or proposals is important According to the Danish Bankruptcy
Act, the debtor must have prepared its proposal and have obtained acceptances from at
least 40 percent of the unsecured creditors in terms of amount before the proposal is filed
with the court
276
Furthermore, once the proposal is filed, the court immediately summons
the creditors to a meeting to vote on the proposal
277
Thus, by limiting the time in which
the debtor, under protection of the stay, can prepare the proposal, and by requiring the
creditors to vote on the proposal shortly after it has been filed, the Danish system ensures
778
minimum delay
was converted to a compulsory composition proceeding, the lenght of this proceeding should be added to
the lenght of the suspension of payments proceeding No information is available on the median time
from the commencement of a compulsory composition proceeding to the confirmation of a plan However,
the delay will usually occur prior to the opening of the composition negotiations, and the composition
proceeding itself normally does not add substantial delay to the reorganization case.
The Danish composition proceeding is less complex becauce it does not include secured debts and
owner interests
5
LoPucki suggests that the debtor "s exclusivity period should be maximized in order to reduce the delay
in chapter 11 proceedings Alternatively, the Bankruptcy Code should have standards for granting
extensions of exclusivity. See LoPucki. 1993 Wis L Rev., at 754
276
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act. sec 166.
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act. sec 169.
8 An argument could be made that 12 months are not enough time to prepare the plan of reorganization
of a large business However, the inquiry among Danish bankruptcy lawyers did not indicate that the time
restictions imposed by the Danish Bankruptcy Act hinder reorganization
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D. Conclusion
Neither Denmark nor the United States systematically collects adequate information on
reorganization cases However, the above mentioned empirical studies provide for the
following conclusion First, the number of business reorganization cases is declining in
both countries Second, debtor demographics show that both in the Denmark and in the
United States, the majority of reorganization cases are small cases, i.e. small compared to
the average sized case in each country. Businesses in Denmark are generally smaller than
in the United States and, therefore, the reorganization cases are smaller too Third,
statistics on the outcome of reorganization cases show that the plan confirmation rates in
both countries are less than 20 percent However, it should be emphasized that a portion
of the remaining approximately 80 percent of the cases may have been reorganized out-of-
court prior to confirmation. Fourth, both chapter 1 1 and the Danish rules on suspension of
payments are to some extent used as preliquidation proceedings This is the situation
especially in Denmark, where more than 50 percent of all suspension of payments cases
are converted to liquidation cases Finally, while delay is a major problem under chapter
1 1 , it has been possible to avoid substantial delay in the Danish reorganization cases
primarily by limiting the length of the period of the suspension payments to a maximum of
12 months
IV. Comparative Analysis and Discussion
A. Introduction
In the Reorganization Inquiry, the Bankruptcy Committee asked the Danish
bankruptcy lawyers to identify the factors that cause reorganization attempts to fail.
According to the bankruptcy lawyers, reorganizations fail because
the reorganization attempt is initiated too late,
the creditors do not support the reorganization attempt because they lack
confidence in the debtor, or its ability to turn the business around,
negative publicity following the filing of suspension of payments,
almost all of the debtor's assets are normally pledged which renders the
debtor unable to provide new capital to finance the reorganization,
the mandatory guarantee for future payments to employees under section
16b of the Danish Bankruptcy Act drains the cash reserves of the debtor, or
the debtor cannot meet the 25 percent minimum payment requirement to
unsecured creditors under the rules on compulsory composition
an insufficient number of the creditors vote to accept the composition
This thesis does not address all of the above problems but focuses on the following
issues First, how can the legislation make the debtor initiate reorganization in a timely
manner9 Second, to what extent should the creditors control the reorganization
proceeding
9281
Third, how does the debtor finance the reorganization9282 Fourth, how can
the rules on acceptance and confirmation be made more flexible9283
9
See the Reorganization Report, at 21-24
280
See infra Part IV B
281
See infra Part IV. C.
282
See infra Part IV.D.
283




B. Initiating the Reorganization in a Timely Manner
Most of the Danish bankruptcy lawyers replied that the debtors in general initiated
the reorganization attempt much too late
~ S4
This delay usually occurs because the
management at first will not admit how serious the financial problems are In addition
hereto, especially in smaller businesses, the management may be unaware of the
seriousness of their problems because of insufficient or erroneous financial data
28
It is crucial for the outcome of a reorganization attempt that it is initiated in a timely
manner The earlier the debtor takes the necessary corrective actions, the better the
chances are of getting the business on its feet again However, neither the Danish
Bankruptcy Act nor the United States Bankruptcy Code contains provisions which make
it mandatory for the management of a financially distressed business to commence
reorganization. Would it further reorganization if the bankruptcy laws under certain
circumstances required the debtor to commence reorganization9 The Danish legislators
have thought it would not Under the previous Danish Bankruptcy Act of 1872, debtors
engaged in business were required to file for bankruptcy or compulsory composition if the
business in three consecutive years had declining net profits, and debts exceeding the
assets with 30 percent or more.
28
' With the enactment of the 1977 Danish Bankruptcy








See the Danish Bankruptcy Act of 1872 sec. 46.
Insolvency is defined as inability to pay debts as they mature See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec 17
subsec 2. See also infra Part IV El concerning a minimum payment requirement as a method to ensure
timely reorganization
However, the Danish corporate laws still have rules which require the board of
directors to take special actions if the corporation
288
has lost a certain percentage of its
equity capital Thus, according to the Danish Companies Act, the board of directors of a
public corporation must call a shareholders meeting not later than six months after the
company has lost half of its share capital At this meeting, the directors must inform the
shareholders about the financial situation of the corporation, and if necessary propose to
the shareholders what actions should be taken.
285
The directors' proposal could be to file
for suspension of payments in order to prepare for a reorganization However, in most
cases, the directors propose less radical actions, or they may suggest to the shareholders
that no immediate actions are required .
L)
The rules applicable where a private corporation
has lost half of its share capital are more rigid. In this situation, the board of directors
must not only call a shareholders meeting and report to the shareholders about the
financial situation of the corporation, they must also propose to the shareholders actions
which will ensure full re-establishment of the share capital, and if that is not possible,
propose to the shareholders the corporation be liquidated
291
8 Two kinds of limited liability corporations exist under the Danish corporate laws Most larger
corporations are public corporations governed by the Companies Act Public corporations must have a
minimum share capital of DKK 500.000 (approximately $80,000) Smaller corporations are usually
private corporations. The private corporations are governed by the Private Corporations Act. which
provide for these corporations to have a minimum share capital of DKK 125.000 (approximately
$20,000).
289
See the Danish Companies Act sec. 69a.
>u
Section 69a is sanctioned with a minor monetary penalty, and violation will not cause the corporation
to be liquidated. See the Danish Companies Act sec. 161. subsec 1.
See the Private Corporations Act sec 85a. If the corporation does not comply with section 85a. the
Danish Commerce and Companies Agency may file a petition with the bankruptcy court to commence
liquidation of the corporation Id. The Agency, however, only obtains information about the financial
affairs of corporations following the mandator) filing of Annual Reports with the Agency.
63
The Bankruptcy Committee suggests that it may be possible to avoid some of the
delav in the commencement of reorganization by making the capital requirement rules
more rigorous
292
However, it is not realistic to think that the Commerce and Companies
Agency as the monitoring official can ensure timely reorganization To do this would
require the Agency to monitor the financial situation of all corporations ' on an ongoing
basis, and such monitoring would not only be very costly, but would also be an
unwarranted interference in the lives of private businesses
Alternatively, it might be considered to impose more rigorous sanctions
294
on
directors and shareholders if they do not commence timely reorganization or liquidation of
the business The effect of such sanctioning is, however, doubtful Nothing indicates that
the delay in reorganization is the result of an informed decision by managers and owners
not to reorganize Rather, the delay is a result of managers and owners doing nothing
because they at that time do not recognize the seriousness of the financial problems The
threat of sanctions is not likely to provide the managers and owners with a better
understanding of the nature of the problems which their business is facing.
29
9
" See the Reorganization Report, at 63.
'3
Not to mention non-corporate businesses which do not file their Annual Reports with the Agency.
The Bankruptcy Committee suggests personal liability for damages and so-called bankruptcy
quarantine Bankruptcy quarantine refers to the rules and circumstances under which persons who
repeatedly have been involved in corporations that collapse can be barred from doing business in a
corporate form See the Reorganization Report, at 63
'5
It should be emphasized that under the current laws, sanctions can be imposed on managers, directors
and shareholders if the operation of the business is continued in a situation where the responsible persons
should have known that a financial collapse was impending In this situation the managers, directors and
shareholders may be liable for damages to the creditors It is. however, rare that creditors sue individuals
for damages One reason for this may be that those persons normally are unable to pay any significant
amount of damages. See the Reorganization Report, at 62 See also UfR. 1977.274HD where the Danish
Supreme Court decided that the board of directors of a department store was not liable for payment for
goods delivered to the store only a few hours before payments were suspended The Supreme Court held
When the United States in 1978 introduced the "debtor in possession
11
in the
Bankruptcy Code it was believed that this new concept would further timely
reorganization Thus, Congress recognized "the need for the debtor to remain in control
to some degree, or else debtors will avoid the reorganization provisions ... until it would
be too late for them to be an effective remedy
11
" Despite the intentions of Congress,
delay in the commencement of reorganizations remains a serious problem As one
commentator put it: "reorganization is often delayed until liquidation of the business
through state remedies is imminent"
297





filing of petitions Does involuntary commencement
further timely reorganization The Danish Bankruptcy Committee think it does The
Committee argues that the creditors have a strong interest in timely reorganization.
29
Thus, by granting the creditors the right to commence reorganization, more
reorganizations should be commenced in a timely manner/
00
Similar to Danish tort laws, the tort laws of the United States provide for personal
liability of officers and directors of insolvent corporations under certain circumstances. It
is well established by most courts that once the business is approaching insolvency, the
officers and directors act, not only in the interest of the shareholders, but also in the
that at the time when the goods were delivered, the directors were still negotiating with the lenders for a
solution which could have avoided the suspension of payments
296
H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong.. 1st Sess. 235 (1978). reprinted in 1978 U.S.C C.A.N . at 6191
See Lynn LoPucki. The Debtor in Full Control-Systems Failure Under Chapter 1 1 of the Bankruptcy
Code9 57 Am. Bankr. L J. 247. 265 (1983)
Generally, an involuntary petition must be filed by three or more creditors. See 11 U.S.C. sec.
303(b)(l)(1994)
299




interest of the creditors
?01
Thus, the officers and directors may be liable for damages if
they in the vicinity of insolvency fail to take the actions necessary to secure the value of
the corporation
Delay in the commencement of reorganization is a serious problem, which neither the
Danish nor the United States laws have addressed successfully However, the decision
whether a business should commence reorganization is a business decision which the
management of the business must make together with their professional consultants The
decision must be based on business judgment and it cannot be made mechanically by
looking at the balance sheets of the business This business judgment cannot and should
not be replaced by rigid rules which force the business into reorganization when neither
the debtor nor the creditors see a need for such action
301
See In re Mortgage Corp . 714 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir.1983). Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland N.V. v.
Pathe Communications Corp . No 12150 (Del Ch. Dec. 30.1991). Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co .. 621
A 2d 784 (Del Ch. 1992)
12
See New York Credit Mens Adjustment Bureau v. Weiss. 110 N.E.2d 397 In this case the two
defendants had purchased a corporation with the purpose of conducting business as a wholesaler of
electrical supplies Only one year later, the defendants had to face that the business had no prospects and
they decided to wind up the affairs of the corporation The defendants elected to liquidate by conducting a
public auction sale The net book value of the assets sold were $73,492.21. but the auction, however, only
brought an amount of $19,866 98 after fees and expenses had been deducted A few days after the auction
an involuntary petition in bankruptcy was filed against the corporation and a trustee was appointed. The
trustee filed suit against the defendants alleging that the circumstances under which the auction was held
constituted a breach of the defendants' fiduciary duties to the creditors Under the New York General
Corporation Law Section 60. the directors of an insolvent corporation was obligated to hold the assets of
the corporation in the interest of the creditors. In determimng whether the corporation was in fact
insolvent the court held "if the corporation was technically solvent but insolvency was approaching and
then was only a few days away, the [directors) were, in effect, trustees by statute for the creditors. .". The
court held that at the time where the auction took place, the directors had fiduciary duties to the creditors
and the way in which the corporation had been liquidated was a breach of those duties.
C. To What Extent Should the Creditors Control the Reorganization?
Although the debtor under both the Danish Bankruptcy Act and the United States
Bankruptcy Code remains in possession of its estate, the creditors exercise some degree of
control over the reorganization proceeding The rationale for the creditors
1
control of the
debtor during the reorganization is clear Once the equity is lost, the creditors bear the
risk of an additional decrease in the value of the business Therefore, because the creditors
bear the risk
30
"" of an attempt to reorganize, the creditors should have influence on the
reorganization
One of the main purposes of the 1984-reform of the Danish rules on suspension of
payments was to give the creditors more influence and control of the reorganization
proceeding
305
While the creditors may have gotten additional influence and control, the
reform failed to significantly improve the success rate of the reorganization attempts.
'
Control of the reorganization can take several forms. First, the debtor may be
controlled totally by the appointment of a trustee to take possession of the estate Second,
as a less radical form of control, the debtor may retain possession of the estate under
supervision of a person appointed by the creditors or the court
?(W
Third, whether or not
the debtor remains in possession of the estate, the formation of a creditors' committee
may be an important way for the creditors to directly monitor and supervise the
While the creditors bear the risk of an unsuccessful reorganization, their potential benefit from a
successful reorganization is limited to full payment of the debts Any additional increase in the value of
the business will benefit the owners
304
See supra Part II B 1
It was expected that more creditors would support the reorganization if the creditors were granted
additional influence on the reorganization. See Report on Suspension of Payments, supra note 27. at 16-
19.
306
See supra Part III C.3b




Finally, the bankruptcy court may exercise supervision and
control of the proceeding
309
1. Trustee. Supervisor, or Debtor in Possession
Prior to the enactment of the United States Bankruptcy Code, a trustee would almost
always be appointed in reorganization cases under chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act The
purpose of the trustee was to act as "prime agent in formulating a plan under Chapter X,
and in operating the business and managing the case "
1(l
The duty of the trustee to
operate the business of the debtor is problematic First, in order to manage the business
efficiently, the trustee must have considerable knowledge about the industry in which the
debtor operates Second, even if it is possible to find a trustee with the right background,
the trustee will need some time to get to know the debtor's business Thus, the exchange
of the previous management with a trustee causes a delay in the proceeding . Third, the
costs involved with the trustee's management of the estate are significant Not only will
there be direct costs in the form of fees to the trustee and the professionals hired to assist
him, indirect costs will occur, because the trustee cannot manage the business as
efficiently as the previous management would have been able to.
308




See H.R Rep No 595. 95 Cong . 1st Sess. 235 (1978). at 235. reprinted in 1978 U.S.CC A.N.. at
6194.
1
' At this point in time delay may have occurred already if the reorganization was not commenced in a
timely manner. See supra Part IV B
'
" Of course there are cases where fraud, gross mismanagement, or dishonesty on the part of the previous
management rules out their participation in the future operation of the business However, in the majority
of cases where only some mismanagement or bad business judgment has occurred, the previous
management should not be excluded from participation in the operation of the business See Harvey R
Miller. The Changing Face of Chapter 11: A Reemergence of the Bankruptcy Judge as Producer.
Director, and Sometimes Star of the Reorganization Passion Play. 69 Am.Bankr. L J 431. 444 (1995)
68
With the enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, the concept of a debtor in
possession was introduced In the legislative history Congress described the benefits of the
debtor in possession concept this way:
"The public and the creditors will not necessarily be harmed if the
debtor is continued in possession in a reorganization case In fact,
very often the creditors will be benefited by continuation of the debtor
in possession, both because the expense of a trustee will not be
required, and the debtor, who is familiar with his business, will be
better able to operate it during the reorganization case A trustee
frequently has to take time to familiarize himself with the business
before the reorganization can get under way Thus, the debtor
continued in possession may lead to a greater likelihood of success in
the reorganization""
'"'
However, the opinions on the benefits of the debtor in possession concept vary. In
support of the debtor in possession, one commentator has concluded: "[T]he concept of
allowing the debtor to remain in possession while administering its reorganization has
proven to be pragmatically superior to requiring the appointment of a trustee and in the
best interest of rehabilitation and reorganization "
l





being that there are presumably unresolvable conflict of
313
See H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95 Cong.. 1st Sess. 233 (1978). at 235. reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N., at
6192.
3,4
See Miller. 69 Bankr. L. J., at 446
5
See Nimmer & Feinberg. Chapter 11 Business Governance: Fiduciary Duties. Business Judgment.
Trustees, and Exclusivity. 6 Bankr Dev. J. 1 (1989). Thomas G Kelch. The Phantom Fiduciary: The
Debtor in Possession in Chapter 11. 38 Wayne L. Rev. 1323 (1992). and Edward S Adams. Governance
in Chapter 1 1 Reorganizations: Reducing Costs. Improving Results. 73 B.U. L. Rev. 581 (1993).
69
interests among the beneficiaries of the fiduciary duties of the debtor in possession . The
beneficiaries include the corporation, the shareholders, and all of the creditors
18
Because
the reorganization process is an inherent battle of interests between the beneficiaries, there
is a paradox in the application of a duty of impartiality on the debtor in possession.
Various proposals have been made to resolve the conflict among the beneficiaries of
the fiduciary duties of the debtor in possession/
20
One of these theories' 21 advocates the
316
Other objections which have been raised include the problem of entrusting the rehabilitation and
protection of interests of creditors and shareholders in the management who caused the financial distress
See Miller. 69 Am Bankr L J . at 444 Also, it has been argued that there is a risk that management of
public corporations who does not own a significant percentage of the stock may be indifferent to the
interests of stockholders. Id. Finally, some commentators have been concerned that the absence of an
independent party in charge of the reorganization will cause delay and inefficiencies in the proceeding
Id., at 446.
The nature of the fiduciary duties of the debtor in possession is not explored in great detail in the case
law. As one commentator concluded: '[BJecause of the vagaries of the case law, it is impossible, for the
bankruptcy authorities, to analyze particular fact situations and have any reach tool to determine how the
fiduciary duty of the debtor in possession will be applied or function"' See Kelch. 38 Wayne L Rev., at
1343 However, the duties that are normally referred to is the duty of care, the duty of loyalty, and the
duty of impartiality toward the beneficiaries of this duty Id. Especially the duty of impartiality is a
problem because the formulation of a plan always to some extent requires a selection of one group over
another
318
See Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub. 471 U.S. 343. 355 (1985)
319
See Kelch. 38 Wayne L. Rev., at 1353
(l
Nimmer and Feinberg have reviewed two theories The first theory is the so-called "Group Favoritism
Theory" under which the debtor in possession chooses one of the competing interest groups and attempts
to maximize values for that group The second theory is referred to as the 'Diffuse Loyalty Theory".
Under this theory, the debtor is forced to pursue reasoned and fair decisions without favoring any
particular group. See Nimmer & Feinberg. 6 Bankr. Dev J., at 32-33. Three additional theones have been
proposed by Stephen H. Case. See Case. Fiduciary Duty of Corporate Directors and Officers. Resolution of
Conflicts Between Creditors and Shareholders, and Removal of Directors by Dissident Shareholders in
Chapter 11 Cases. c638 ALL ABA 489 (1991). Case's first theory is the so-called "Pro Equity Theory"
Under this theory the debtor in possession has to make decisions as if there were no bankruptcy process.
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current debtor in possession structure reformed by removing so-called "Fundamental
Bankruptcy Decisions
1
' from the debtor in possession to a neutral trustee . However, the
trustee's decision power should be limited to Fundamental Bankruptcy Decisions, leaving
so-called "Business Activity Decisions"" ' to the debtor in possession Adams argues that
his model would not only ensure independent decisions about the course of the
reorganization, but also provide for an efficient operation of the business
'
Division of the decision making power in the reorganization process is not without
problems The introduction of a supervisor" as an additional player in the process may
give rise to a conflict of interests between the management and the supervisor, especially
i.e. decisions must be made in the interest of the owners of the business Id., at 499. The second theory
proposed by Case is the "Pro Creditor Theory" which embodies the absolute priority rule Under this
theory, the debtor in possession of an insolvent business must make decisions in the interests of the
creditors Id. Cases third theory, the so-called "Stakeholder Mediator Theory", is similar to Nimmer and
Feinberg's Diffuse Loyalty Theory and thus requires the debtor in possession to remain impartial Id.
Finally, the theory developed by Thomas G Kelch should be mentioned. Under this so-called
"Adversarial Model", the debtor, except for the duty of care for the assets of the estate, has no fiduciary
duties to any group in the Chapter 1 1 process Thus, the debtor in possession would be allowed to pursue
whatever is perceived to be in its best interest, and conflicts among interest groups would be resolved
through the existing adversarial process before the Bankruptcy Court. See Kelch. 38 Wayne L. Rev., at
1361-1377.
3:1
See Adams. 73 B.U. L. Rev., at 620.
2 The primary Fundamental Bankruptcy Decision is the decision whether to reorganize or liquidate. Id.,
at 622.
3
In short the Business Activity Decisions are decisions about the day-to-day affairs of the business. Id.
24
Id., at 634. Adam's proposal to restrict the decisions of the debtor in possession to Business Activity
Decisions is not far from the current system under the Danish Bankruptcy Act Under these rules, a debtor
which has suspended its payments must obtain approval by the supervisor of all significant acts of
management See supra Part II B la.
' 5 Adams refer to this creditors representative as a "trustee". To avoid confusion of the trustee in Adam's
model and the typical trustee who takes possession oxer the estate, this person is hereinafter referred to as
the "supervisor".
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in the situations where the supervisor acts to protect the rights of the creditors.
3 ' 6
Another
problem is that the supervisor may end up making many of the business decisions which
the debtor in possession was supposed to make Because of the supervisor's monitoring
function, some managers may wish to consult the supervisor in most matters to guard
themselves against critique from the creditors . When that happens, the efficiency of the
debtor in possession concept is lost because the estate is burdened with both salaries to
the management and fees to the supervisor. If the supervisor in addition has strong
opinions about the operation of the business, the content of the debtor in possession may
almost disappear/
28
2. The Unsecured Creditors' Committee3"
In order for the debtor to propose a plan of reorganization, which the creditors will
vote to accept, the debtor will normally have to negotiate the contents of the plan with the
creditors These negotiations are conducted most efficiently, if the debtor negotiates with
a committee representing the creditor body Furthermore, with the establishment of a
6
The supervisor appointed under the Danish Bankruptcy Code is primarily a creditor representative
However, the risk of conflict of interests is reduced by allowing the debtor to suggest who is going to act
as the supervisor. See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec 10. subsec. 2.
The requirement under the Danish Bankruptcy Act of the supervisor's approval of post-petition debt in
order to get priority in a potential subsequent liquidation proceeding, strongly encourages the supervisor's
involvement in the day-to-day business affairs. See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec 94. no 2.
28
It is important that the superv isor from the beginning of the proceeding gives the management a clear
instruction about what decisions the management may take without seeking prior approval from the
supervisor
29
Because the Danish compulsory composition is limited to unsecured debt, and thus does not discharge
the rights of the existing owners, it is not considered necessary to establish equity security committees
under the Danish Bankruptcy Act.
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committee it is possible to monitor and supervise the reorganization in a way which would
not have been possible for the individual creditors
Under the current Danish rules, a creditor's committee may be appointed by the
bankruptcy court upon the request of a creditor or the supervisor. The creditors'
committee consists of up to three members
3,1
appointed by the bankruptcy court. The
committee is regularly informed by the supervisor about the affairs of the business, and, in




" The purpose of the creditors' committee in its current form is entirely
controlling, and the committee is not in any significant manner expected to participate in
the drafting of a plan of reorganization
The Danish Bankruptcy Committee have proposed that the rules concerning the
creditors committee should be reformed to further the creditors' participation in the
reorganization proceeding . ' The first step in this direction was taken last year when a
reform of the Danish Bankruptcy Act opened up for compensation of members of the
creditors' committee.
33
Although compensation of the members of the creditors'
50
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec 14. subsec 1 The bankruptcy court should appoint a creditors'
committee if the debtor and supervisor, or a majority of the creditors support the request See
LINDENCRONE & 0RGAARD. BETALINGSSTANDSNINGRET 1990. at 63-64 (1990)
51
If the debtor employs more than 25 people, an employee representative is entitled to join the committee
as a fourth member See the Danish Bankruptcy Act. sec. 14. subsec. 1.
" If the creditors cannot agree to suggest three persons among themselves, the bankruptcy court may
hold an election. See LINDENCRONE & 0RGAARD. BETALINGSSTANDSNINGRET 1990. at 64
333
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec. 15. subsec 4
334
See LINDENCRONE & 0RGAARD. BETALINGSSTANDSNINGRET 1990. at 66
5 The 1984-reform of the Danish Bankruptcy Act focused on the protection of creditors' rights more
than the creditors' participation in the reorganization
,6
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec. 239. subsec. 3 Prior to the 1996-reform. the bankruptcy court
could allow compensation of members of the creditors' committee only under "exceptional
circumstances".
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committee is essential if it is to be expected that its members take their assignment
seriously,
337
additional reformation of the Danish Bankruptcy Act is required if the
creditors" committee shall become an active player in the reorganization proceeding
In the United States, Congress was very ambitious about the role of the creditors'
committee in the reorganization proceeding Thus, the creditors
1
committees "will be the
primary negotiating bodies for the formulation of the plan of reorganization"," '* and
"should be a vital and integral part of the plan formulation process". To ensure the
establishment of a creditors
1
committee in chapter 11 proceedings, section 1102 of the
Bankruptcy Code makes the appointment of an unsecured creditors' committee
mandatory.
340
In addition to the unsecured creditors" committee, upon the request of a
party in interest, the court may appoint additional creditors
1
committees, and committees
of holders of equity security interests
" 41
The experiences with the committee structure have not come up to the expectations
of Congress and in many cases the creditors' committee is "totally inactive and
ineffective".
342
In addition to the above mentioned problem with lack of compensation of
committee members, commentators have pointed out the following problems with the
3
Commentators have emphasized that the lack of compensation beyond expenses provided to committee
members under the United States Bankruptcy Code contributes to the ineffectiveness of those committees
See Adams. 73 B.U L. Rev., at 614
338




" For cause, or if the debtor entity is a so-called 'small business", i.e. the aggregate noncontingent
liquidated secured and unsecured debts do not exceed $2.000.000. the court may decide not to order the
appointment of a creditors' committee. See 1 1 US C sec 1 102 (a) (3) and sec. 101 (51C) (1994)
341
See 11 U.S.C sec. 1102 (a) (2) (1994).
342
See In re B & W Tractor Co.. 38 BR 613.615 (Bankr.E.D.N.C. 1984).
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committee structure First, in many cases, a creditors
1
committee is not even appointed
343
because the bankruptcy court considers it meaningless
,44
Second, especially in smaller
cases, the United States trustee may be unable to find creditors willing to serve on the
committee?
45
Third, in only few cases the members of the creditors' committee have the
experience and skills necessary to evaluate and investigate a debtor's business or
reorganization plan.
346
Finally, most committees are passive because the committee has no
direct power to control the debtor
347
The experience with the committee structure under the United States Bankruptcy
Code shows that, except for large cases, it is no easy task to activate the creditors in the
reorganization procedure Most creditors wisely reason that their time is better spent
managing their own business, and it is not realistic to require individual managers of
creditors to spend any significant time as committee members Therefore, a creditors'
committee cannot operate, unless it can retain professionals to perform the majority of its
work, and that in effect limits the use of committees to large reorganization cases.
4
343 A study by LoPucki stated that a creditors' committee was appointed only in approximately 40 percent
of the cases studied See Lynn M LoPucki & William C. Whitford. Corporate Governance in the
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large. Publicly Held Companies. 141 U Pa L Rev 669. 681 (1993).
344
The creditors" committee conducts its work primarily through professionals hired by the committee at
the expense of the estate. Where lack of funds makes the estate unable to retain professionals, many courts
have held the appointment of a creditors' committee illusory Sec Miller. 69 Am Bankr. L. J . at 449
345
Id. See also 11 U.S.C. sec. 1102 (b) (1) (1994) which provide for the appointment of "persons, willing
to serve"
346




In Denmark very few cases can be classified as "large cases". See supra Part III C 1 stating that in less
than one-third of the cases, the debtor employs more than 25 people No statistics show how many of
these cases were large cases, but it is unlikely that in more than 5-10 percent of the cases, the estate would
be able to pay significant fees to committee professionals.
75
How should the debtor in possession in small cases be supervised and controlled
Under the United States Bankruptcy Code, unless a trustee is appointed, virtually no
supervision and control exists in small cases Should the bankruptcy court supervise and
control small reorganization cases9
""
3. The Bankruptcy Court as Major Player in Reorganization Cases
Under the current Danish laws on reorganization, the bankruptcy court is involved
little in the administration of the case Thus, during the suspension of payments
proceeding, the duties of the bankruptcy court are limited to appointment of a
supervisor/
50





the bankruptcy court makes certain decisions concerning the scope of the automatic
stay,
35 :
and decides whether there are sufficient grounds for the continuation and
extension of the proceeding.
353
The duties of the bankruptcy court during the compulsory composition proceeding
are more extensive Here the court decides to open the composition negotiations, it
summons the creditors to the meeting at which they vote on the proposal,'
55
it decides
whether a supervisor should be appointed,
356
and it confirms the composition proposal
35
349
See infra Part W.B 3
50
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec. 10. subsec. 2.
351
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec. 14. subsec 1.
352
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec. 16a.
53
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec. 16e. subsec. 2.
354
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec. 167.
55
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec. 169.
56
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec 168. subsec 2 and sec. 181
5
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec 178. subsec. 1.
76
Furthermore, the bankruptcy court decides any disputes concerning claims against the
estate
358
In neither the suspension of payments proceeding, nor the compulsory composition
proceeding is the bankruptcy court the major player in the supervision and control of the
debtor in possession The bankruptcy court decides disputes which arise during the
proceedings, but is otherwise primarily involved in the filing of the case, and in the
approval of the final result
The role of the bankruptcy court in the reorganization proceedings under the United
States Bankruptcy Code has been changed substantially over the past 20 years. Under the
previous Bankruptcy Act, the bankruptcy court was actively involved in the administration
and day-to-day affairs of bankruptcy reorganization cases.
359 Many viewed the mingling of
administrative duties with the judicial responsibilities of the bankruptcy court as a serious
threat against the impartiality of the court
360
It was, therefore, a major objective of the
1978-reform to remove many of the administrative responsibilities from the bankruptcy
_. 361
court.
Under the Bankruptcy Code most of the administration of reorganization cases has
been transferred to the trustee and the United States trustee, and the monitoring of the
proceeding has been transferred to the creditors' committee
362
However, because of a
^ See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec 175. subsec. 2.
359
See Miller. 69 Am. Bankr. L. J., at 434.
360
See Erica P. Rogers. United States Trustee System. 2 Nev. Law.. 16 (Mar. 1994).
361
See H.R. Rep. no. 595. 95th Cong.. 1st Sess. 235 (1978). reprinted in 1978 U.S.CCA N 5963. 6050.
>:
In cases where with little creditor participation, the United States Trustee is supposed to monitor and
control the case. According to section 586(a)(3) of Judiciary and Judicial Procedures Act. the duties of the
United States Trustee include reviewing applications for compensation and reimbursement, monitoring
plans and disclosure statements, ensuring filing of the various reports and payment of fees, and
monitoring creditors' committees and the progress of the case. The Umted States Trustee did not live up
to its projected role in the reorganization cases. Limited resources and lack of direction and uniformity in
77
widespread creditor apathy, and the inability of the United States Trustee to fill the
vacuum of the lack of creditor participation, there has been a continuing erosion of the
principle of separation of judicial and administrative functions. ' ' Amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code in 1986 and 1994 have contributed to this development Thus, in 1986,
section 105(a) was amended to authorize bankruptcy judges to make broad orders to
prevent an abuse of the process In reality, many bankruptcy courts use section 105(a) to
manage and control the reorganization case/
64
In 1994 additional amendments to section
1 05 were made to authorize the bankruptcy court to hold status conferences, and at these
conferences, issue orders to ensure that the case is handled expeditiously and
economically.
36
According to Miller, with the amendments of section 105, the
administration of reorganization cases has come to a full circle, and it is now almost
similar to the administration under the Bankruptcy Act.
36
' Miller concludes that the
bankruptcy judge is now "the producer, director, and, potentially, star of the drama
presented by bankruptcy cases".
36
In addition hereto. Miller concludes "that the
separation of judicial and administrative functions may not be pragmatic or beneficial in
the administration of the duties and responsibilities of this office have been pointed out as the primary
reasons for the failure of the United States Trustee See Miller. 69 Am Bankr L. J . at 454.
33
Id., at 434 See also United Savings Association v. Timbers of Imvood Forest Associates. Ltd (In re
Timbers of Imvood Forest Associates. Ltd). 808 F 2d 363 (5th Cir.1987). aff d. 484 U.S. 365 (1988) In
this case the Fifth Circuit held that it is essential for the outcome of the reorganization effort that the
bankruptcy court on an ongoing basis is involved in the managing of the case Id., at 373.
364
See Hon Manuel D Leal. The Power of the Bankruptcy Court: Section 105. 29 S.Tex. L. Rev. 487
(1988)
365
See 1 1 U.S.C sec. 105 (d) (1994).
366




the context of bankruptcy reorganization cases", ' and giving up this principle may




In Denmark, the bankruptcy courts are only little involved in the administration of
reorganization cases, not because the legislators are concerned about the impartiality of
the courts, but because the workload of the courts does not allow judges to administer the
estates themselves.'
170
Reorganization cases are generally administered by the supervisor at
the expense of the estate If the estate cannot pay the fee to a supervisor it is generally
presumed that an attempt to reorganize serves no purpose.
371
4. Conclusion
Under the current Danish bankruptcy laws, the debtor remains in possession and
operates the estates monitored and controlled by a supervisor There are strong arguments
in favor of a debtor in possession structure which rule out the trustee as the operator of
the business in the typical reorganization case The creditors must have some degree of
influence and control on the reorganization proceeding to ensure their continuing
confidence in the reorganization proceeding and final acceptance of the reorganization
plan Creditor influence in the form of one or more creditors
1
committees is a viable
solution only in large reorganization cases Court supervision and control may be an
alternative to direct creditor participation in smaller cases However, in Denmark the vast






See Report no. 606 (II) on Bankruptcy and Compulsory Composition. 41(1977)
1
The bankruptcy court may under exceptional circumstances decide that the Treasury shall guarantee
the payment of fees to the supervisor. See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec. 1 1. subsec. 3.
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administration would be required, and, therefore, this solution would add a tremendous
and unrealistic amount of work on the bankruptcy courts
The current structure with supervision and control by an external creditor
representative is superior to any of the above alternatives However, it would further
reorganization if there were less interference by the supervisor in the operation of the
business The current rules where all significant acts of management must be approved by
the supervisor is too restrictive The creditors must trust the business judgment of the
debtor in possession, and the supervisor should not censor general business decisions
Approval of acts of management is required only if the decision significantly alters the
business of the debtor and, thus, influences the likelihood of payment of debts, or the
decision disturbs the correlation between individual creditors/
D. Financing the Reorganization
1. Introduction
A fundamental concern of the debtor is obtaining adequate funds to finance the
reorganization Funds are necessary,"' " not only to finance cash payments under the plan
of reorganization, but also to finance the operation of the business during the
2
With a limitation of the decisions which require approval by the supervisor, a change of section 94. no
2 of the Danish Bankruptcy Act is necessary This provision gives debts approved by the supervisor
priority in a subsequent bankruptcy Section 94 should be altered to give all debts arising from the
continuation of the ordinary business priority.
3
If the business can get through the first few days after the commencement of reorganization, the
suspension of payments allowed by the automatic stay may generate substantial cash reserves in
businesses with a large cashflow. See Lynn LoPucki & William C Whitford. Corporate Governance in
the Bankruptcy Reorgamzation of Large. Publicly Held Companies. 141 U.Pa L Rev. 669 (1993)
reorganization period/
74
Because the business is undergoing reorganization, lenders are
generally reluctant to provide the debtor with fresh capital, unless they get special
assurance of payment.
When asked what causes reorganization attempts to fail, a majority of the Danish
bankruptcy lawyers pointed to the problems of financing the reorganization as one of the
major factors.
37
' Although the problem of financing the reorganization is not a new
problem in the bankruptcy context, there are indications which suggest that an increase in
the relative amount of secured debt over the last 10-15 years has made it substantially
more difficult to finance reorganizations. According to a Norwegian survey,'
76
the average
percentage of assets to which secured interest are attached has risen from 62 percent in
1976 to 126 percent in 1989/ Thus, having passed 100 percent, it is clear that debtors
generally have no assets in which new loans can be secured, and, therefore, the financing
of the reorganization depends entirely on the means of assurance provided for in the
A
Businesses experiencing financial difficulties are often in an immediate need of cash to meet a payroll
at the end of the week The need for immediate cash to maintain the operation puts a great pressure, not
only on the debtor in possession who must find the necessary money, but also on the bankruptcy judge or
supervisor who must approve the terms and conditions of a postpetition financing agreement See David
Gray Carlson. Postpetition Security Interests Under the Bankruptcy Code. 48 Buslaw 483 (1993).
75
See the Reorganization Report, at 23
76
See the Reorgamzation Report, at 77 referring to the Norwegian report on bankruptcy "Etterkontrol af
konkurslovgi\Tiingen". NOU 16:1993.
Id. The Norwegian survey caused the Danish Bankruptcy Commission to raise the question, whether it
is necessary to impose restrictions on the debtors right to pledge certain assets outside of bankruptcy The
legislators in the other Scandinavian countries have had similar speculations Thus, in Finland security
interests in inventory and accounts receivable have been limited to a maximum of 50 percent, and in
Norway it has even been considered to prohibit security interests in those assets. However, because
restrictions in obtaining secured debt may have a general negative effect on business financing, the
Bankruptcy Committee concludes that at the moment no such restrictions should be imposed Id., at 78-
79
bankruptcy laws. Such assurance may take the form of providing the lender priority
position ahead of general unsecured debt, or it may provide for a senior or equal lien on
assets alreadv encumbered
,7
2. Financing Reorganization under the Danish Bankruptcy Act
After a debtor has filed for suspension of payments, credit can be obtained under
section 94, number 2 of the Danish Bankruptcy Act This section gives debt, approved by
the supervisor, priority in a potential subsequent liquidation ahead of claims of
3*70 3fi/l
employees and general unsecured claims but subordinated to administrative expenses
allowed in the subsequent liquidation proceeding.
381
If the reorganization attempt
succeeds and a compulsory composition proposal is accepted and confirmed, debt
approved by the supervisor must be paid in full because the composition does not include
priority claims.
382
Extension of credit based only on the priority provided by section 94 is risky because
the liquidation of unencumbered assets in many cases covers only the administrative
8
Because the capital to finance the reorganization usually will have to come from prepetition creditors,
the bankruptcy laws may also allow some sort of preference to prepetition debt Although preference of
prepetition debt may effectively further the financing of the reorganization such preferences are generally
considered suspicious because they violate the fundamental bankruptcy policy of equal treatment of
similar situated creditors. See infra Part IV. D. 3.
3 9
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec. 95
380
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec 97.
381
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec. 93.
i2
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec 158. subsec. 2. no. 2. Generally, debt paid after the date of the
filing of the petition is avoidable under section 172. unless it is paid in accordance with the priority
scheme in the Danish Bankruptcy Act. it is paid to avoid a loss for the estate, or it is paid to a good faith
recipient However, under section 172, subsection 3. also debt paid with approval of the supervisor is
unavoidable, unless the supervisor has gone beyond his apparent authority.
82
expenses paid ahead of section 94.
38,
However, the current Danish Bankruptcy Act does
not allow the debtor to displace existing lienholders with postpetition liens, and, therefore,





The responses from the Danish bankruptcy lawyers strongly suggest that
neither the priority under section 94, nor the threat of liquidation is sufficient means of
providing adequate financing of the reorganization
3. Financing the Reorganization under the Bankruptcy Code
Section 364 of the Bankruptcy Code articulates four methods of obtaining credit
38
Section 364 is progressive in the sense that only if the trustee or debtor in possession
383
See LINDENCRONE & 0RGAARD. BETALINGSSTANDSNTNGRET 1990. at 96 n. 34.
!4
Additional credit from existing creditors may be available if the debtor can convince such creditors
that their only chance of payment is to support the continuation of the operation of the business.
385
Section 364 (a)-(d) states:
§ 364 Obtaining Credit
(a) If the trustee is authorized to operate the business of the debtor under section 721. 1 108, 1203.
1204. or 1304 of this title, unless the court orders otherwise, the trustee may obtain unsecured
credit and incur unsecured debt in the ordinary course of business allowable under section
503(b)( 1 ) of this title as an administrative expense.
Ob) The court, after notice and a hearing, may authorize the trustee to obtain unsecured credit or to
incur unsecured debt other than under subsection (a) of this section, allowable under section
5O30b)(l) of this title as an administrative expense.
(c) If the trustee is unable to obtain unsecured credit allowable under section 503(b)(1) of this title
as an administrative expense, the court, after notice and a hearing, may authorize the obtaining of
credit or the incurring of debt-
( 1
)
with priority over any or all administrative expenses of the kind specified in section
503(b) or 507(b) of this title;
(2) secured by a lien on property of the estate that is not otherwise subject to a lien; or
(3) secured by a junior lien on property of the estate that is subject to a lien
(d)(1) The court after notice and a hearing, may authorize the obtaining of credit or the incurring
of debt secured by a senior or equal lien on property of the estate that is subject to a lien only if-
(A) the trustee is unable to obtain such credit otherwise; and
(B) there is adequate protection of the interest of the holder of the lien on the property of the
estate on which such semor or equal lien is proposed to be granted.
83
cannot finance the reorganization under section 364(a) or (b) is he allowed to obtain
credit under subsection (c), and only where it is not possible to obtain credit under
subsection (c) the trustee or debtor in possession is allowed to obtain credit under
subsection (d).
386
Section 364(a) authorizes the trustee or debtor in possession, without court
approval
38
notice, or a hearing, to obtain financing by granting the creditor
administrative priority on the claim. However, subsection (a) is limited to debt incurred
"in the ordinary course of business"
,8X
Debt which is not obtained in the ordinary course
of business may be allowed administrative priority, but only with court authorization
granted after notice and a hearing.
389
Because debt incurred outside the ordinary' course of
business will be general unsecured debt if it is incurred without court approval, a lender is
wisely advised to seek court approval if it is not obvious that the debt falls inside the
ordinary course of business/
9
* The procedure for the court's authorization of credit is
(2) In any hearing under this subsection, the trustee has the burden of proof on the issue of
adequate protection
11 USC sec 364(1994)
386
The trustee or debtor in possession is not required to exhaust the possibility of alternative financing by
seeking credit from an infinite number of possible lenders However, the trustee or debtor in possession is
required to make an effort to earn the burden established in section 364. See In re Reading Tube
Industries. 72 Bankr 329. 332 (Bankr E D Pa 1987)
The court can issue an order which limits the right of the trustee or debtor in possession to use section
364(a). The court may do so where the financing would not benefit the estate or assist the reorgamzation
procedure. See In re Thurmond. 41 Bankr 464. 465 (Bankr D Or. 1983).
*8
Credit is in the ordinary course of the business if such credit is "normally" or "customarily" sought by
the debtor See In re John Deskin Pic Pac. Inc.. 59 Bankr 809. 812 (Bankr WD. Va.l986)( not
customarily to extend credit in order to purchase a business). See also In re Gloria Mfg Corp . 65 Bankr
341. 345 (Bankr. E.D.Va. 1985)(credit to meet payroll allowed administrative priority).
389
See 11 USC. sec. 364 (b) (1994).
390
See P. MURPHY. CREDITORS" RIGHTS IN BANKRUPTCY § 8.03. at 8-4 (2d ed 1988).
84
governed by Bankruptcy Rule 4001(c) Generally, the final hearing on the motion of
obtaining credit must be held no earlier than fifteen days after service of the motion and
notice to the creditors However, an immediate authorization may be granted to avoid
immediate and irreparable harm to the estate
91
If the reorganization attempt does not succeed and the case is converted to a chapter
7 liquidation case, administrative expenses authorized under section 364 are subordinated
to administrative expenses incurred after the conversion.
391
This possible subordination
makes it risky for lenders to rely on the general administrative expenses priority provided
for in section 364(a) and (b). Therefore, under section 364(c), the court may authorize
credit with superpriority, i.e. priority ahead of all administrative expenses including
administrative expenses incurred after the conversion of the case to a chapter 7 liquidation
proceeding Alternatively, the court may authorize the credit to be secured by a lien on
unencumbered assets or a junior lien on assets already encumbered
9
' Before priority
under section 364(c) is granted, the trustee or debtor in possession must prove that a
good faith effort has been made to obtain credit under section 364(a) or (b), that the
lender extends the credit in good faith,
394
and that the credit will benefit the reorganization
of the estate.
395
If no other alternative financing is available, the court, as a last resort, may authorize
debt secured by a senior or equal lien on property already encumbered.
396
In addition to
the requirements under subsection (c), the trustee or debtor in possession must prove that
the rights of the creditor already secured by the property in question are adequately
391
See Bankruptcy Rule 4001(c)(2).
392
See 11 U.S.C. sec. 726 (b) (1994).
393
See 1 1 U.S.C. sec. 364 (c) (2) and (3) (1994).
394
See In re Gloria Mfg. Corp.. 65 Bankr 341. 347 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.) affd 75 Bankr 553 (E.D.Pa.1987)
395
See In re Executive Air Sens.. 62 Bankr 474. 477 (Bankr.D.Utah 1986).
396




' Adequate protection can be proved either by showing existence of a
sufficient equity cushion.
398
by compensating the secured creditor in cash for the decrease
in the value of the lien/
99
or by providing the existing creditor with an additional or
replacement lien
Where lenders have been unwilling to extend credit on the basis of the priority and
security provided for under section 364, some courts have allowed various advantages
and preferences to prepetition creditors in exchange for postpetition credit Most
commonly, lenders demand so-called "cross-collateralization'", i.e. the lenders want their




See 11 U.S.C. sec. 364 (d) (1) (B) (1994).
398 An equity cushion exists where the value of the collateral securing the debt exceeds the amount of the
debt. See In re Snowshoe Co.. 789 F.2d 1085. 1088 (4th Cir. 1986)
39
See Daniel V Goodsell. Extending Post-Petition Credit to Reorganizing Debtors: Understanding the
Tricks and Traps of Bankruptcy Code Section 364. 1990 Utah L Rev 93 (1990) The calculation of the
cash payment compensation is illustrated by the following example If the existing creditor loaned
$200,000 in return for a security interest in collateral worth $300,000. and a senior lien to a new lender is
authorized in the amount of $150,000. the existing creditor is left with collateral worth $150,000 and
must be compensated $50,000 for its loss of value in the security interest Id., at 106
40,1
Id
11 Many courts have upheld and approved loan agreements which included cross-collateralization. See
David Gray Carlson. Postpetition Security Interests Under the Bankruptcy Code. 48 Bus Law 483. 497
(1993) However, in Shapiro v. Saybrook Mfg. Co (In re Saybrook Mfg. Co .). 963 F.2d 1490 (11th
Cir. 1992) the Eleventh Circuit held that cross-collateralization is not authorized by section 364 and that
such clauses are illegal because they violate the priority scheme and equal treatment standard of the
Bankruptcy Code Id, at 1494-1495. In a comment to the Shapiro decision. Donald A. Jordan is
concerned that denial of cross-collateralization may hinder effective reorganization of especially smaller
businesses See Donal A Jordan. Cross-Collateralization in Chapter 1 1 : Protecting the Small Business.
40 Wayne L Rev. 219(1993)
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some courts have approved so-called "cross-priority" and "whitewash"
40,
clauses, or
allowance of postpetition interest in exchange for postpetition credit
404
4. Improving Postpetition Financing Under the Danish Bankruptcy Act
The above summary of the methods of obtaining credit under the Danish Bankruptcy
Act and the United States Bankruptcy Code reveals that the debtor reorganizing under the
Bankruptcy Code is granted more options and a greater flexibility than the debtor
reorganizing under the Danish Bankruptcy Act In essence, the Danish Bankruptcy Act
provide the debtor with options similar to the ones found in section 364(a) and (b) of the
Bankruptcy Code, but not the superpriority found in section 364(c) and (d)
a. Superpriority Ahead of all Administrative Expenses
405
The authorization of superpriority administrative expenses paid ahead of all other
administrative expenses meets the lender's concern for subordination of its loan to
administrative expenses incurred during a potential subsequent liquidation proceeding
>2
Cross-priority clauses provide for superpriority similar to section 364 (c) (1) to prepetition debt. See
Carlson. 48 Bus Law., at 505
j3 A whitewash clause could for example provide for the forgiving of fraudulent conveyances in exchange




See 11 U.S.C. sec. 364 (c) (1) (1994) The option for the court to authorize a lien on unencumbered
assets or a junior lien in assets already encumbered is not discussed Credit obtained with such security is
allowed under the Danish Bankruptcy Act with the acceptance of the supervisor provided that the lien
secures new financing only Cross-collateralization is avoidable under section 70 of the Danish
Bankruptcy Act. Similarly, loan agreements containing cross-priority or whitewash clauses are avoidable
under section 72 or 74 of the Danish Bankruptcy Act
87
However, superpriority administrative expenses under section 364(c) remain unsecured
debt, and, therefore, if the reorganization fails, the lender will be paid only if the estate has
unencumbered property which can be liquidated to pay the superpriority administrative
expenses
According to the Danish Bankruptcy Committee,
406
all the debtor's assets are
generally encumbered, and. therefore, it is unlikely that a reform of the Danish Bankruptcy
Act which implements a provision similar to section 364(c) of the Bankruptcy Code
would add much to solve the problem of financing the reorganization
b. Superpriority Liens
The lack of unencumbered property to secure new credit is the key to the problem of
financing the reorganization. When all the property of the estate is encumbered, the debtor
is locked to the existing lenders and the debtor is dependent on their willingness to extend
credit Should the bankruptcy laws force the existing lenders to extend credit Preferably
no The prepetition financing and security agreements are the results of a bargain between
the lenders and the debtor, and the lenders should not be deprived the benefit of their
bargain If the bankruptcy laws provided for such a result it might have a serious
adversarial effect on financial institutions' general willingness to finance businesses
407 On
the other hand, if the bankruptcy laws are not allowed to affect the position of the secured
prepetition lenders, these lenders may hinder the reorganization of the debtor business to
the detriment of the unsecured creditors, the owners of the business, the employees, and
406
See supra Part IV.D.l
The Danish Bankruptcy Committee has a similar concern for the possible effect of a legislation which
generally will exclude certain assets from security agreements. See the Reorganization Report, at 78-79
88
other constituencies Thus, in essence the question is how to balance the interests of the
secured prepetition creditors against the overall objective of reorganization
The current Danish Bankruptcy Act clearly favors the secured prepetition creditors
This is obvious from the fact that the compulsory composition does not include secured
debt and thus does not effect the rights of fully secured creditors.
408
Therefore,
authorization of superpriority liens to secure the financing of the reorganization would be
a radical change of a fundamental principle in Danish bankruptcy law Nevertheless, the
case for allowing superpriority liens is strong If alternative lenders are willing to finance
the reorganization, reluctant prepetition lenders should not be allowed to hinder
reorganization It is not thereby said that the rights of the existing lenders should be
forfeited On the contrary, the bankruptcy laws should provide for the best possible
protection of the secured creditor's rights
Under the Bankruptcy Code, the rights of the existing lenders are protected by the
''adequate protection
1
' clause in section 364(d)(1)(B)
409
The purpose of adequate
protection is to ensure that the secured creditor receives value essentially what he
bargained for in the situation where the secured creditor cannot receive his bargain in kind
because granting this absolute right would be impossible or seriously detrimental to the
bankruptcy laws.
410
Adequate protection is most commonly provided by proving existence
of an equity cushion
411
Thus, where a comfortable equity cushion exists, the prepetition
secured creditor is held to be adequately protected However, some courts have held that
408
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec. 158. subsec. 2
409
Adequate protection is defined in section 361 of the Bankruptcy Code Thus, adequate protection may
be provided by (1) a cash payment or periodic cash payments; (2) an additional or replacement lien, or (3)
other relief granted as an administrative expense See 1 1 US C. sec. 361(1)-(3)(1994)
410
See In re Dunes Casino Hotel. 69 Bankr 784. 794 (BankrD N.J. 1986) (quoting H R. Rep No. 595,
95th Cong . 1st Sess at 339 (1977). reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5787. 6295).
411
See supra Part IV.D 3
89
the existence or absence of an equity cushion alone is not determinative It is argued that
the existence of the equity cushion is part of the bargain, and, therefore, the rights of the
secured creditor are not adequately protected by a finding of such an equity cushion.
41 '
Instead the court is required to take into consideration a number of factors, including the
presence of equity, the likelihood of harm, and the prospects of reorganization
4
" If this
multiple analyzis shows that the secured creditor is not adequately protected, the estate
must compensate the creditor in cash or by means of a replacement lien
Under the Danish Bankruptcy Act, a variant of the "adequate protection" requirement
is found in section 16a. According to this provision, the court can order the automatic
stay to include actions initiated by secured creditors.
414
However, if the actions of secured
creditors are stayed, the debtor must pay the usual installments provided for under the
loan agreement.
415
While the payment of installments may be considered adequate
protection of the secured creditor's rights in an automatic stay scenario,
416
the situation is
different when a superpriority lien is authorized In the latter situation, the secured
creditor should be compensated for the decrease in the value of its interest in the
collateral If the creditor is comfortably oversecured there is room for a senior lien
412




See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec. 16a. subsec. 1.
See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec. 16a. subsec. 2. To ensure payment of the installments, the
bankruptcy court can order the installments be periodically deposited with an independent bank or
financial institution Id,
The purpose of section 16a is to ensure the debtor possession of property essential to the
reorganization The effect of an order under section 16a is that actions are stayed during the period of the
suspension of payments. Because the suspension of payments period is maximized to 12 months, the delay
which is forced on the secured creditor is limited Furthermore, unless the use of the property changes, the
payment of installments gives the secured creditor the protection against depreciation which he originally
bargained for
90
without compensatory payments However, if that is not the situation, the bankruptcy
laws must provide for compensation of the prepetition secured creditor The analyzis and
the means of compensation provided for under the adequate protection provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code could be a model for a reform of the Danish Bankruptcy Act However,
to ensure full and effective compensation of the rights of the prepetition secured creditor,
the more comprehensive analyzis presented by the court in Alyucan should be used rather
than a mechanical equity cushion test
E. Minimum Payment, Acceptance and Confirmation Requirements
1. Introduction
According to section 161 of the Danish Bankruptcy Act, the bankruptcy court cannot
confirm a composition proposal which offers the general unsecured creditors less than 25
percent payment, unless all of such creditors have agreed hereto, or special circumstances
apply
418
The legislative history to section 161 indicates that this provision was included in
the Danish Bankruptcy Act primarily because the other Scandinavian countries had similar
clauses in their bankruptcy laws.
419
The other Scandinavian Bankruptcy Committees
argued that a 25 percent minimum payment would motivate the debtor to initiate the
417
See supra Part IV D.4.b at note 412
8
The "special circumstances" exception is rarely applied According to the legislative history, special
circumstances may be found in situations where an individual debtor is forced to reorganize because of
illness, or where the debtor otherwise could not have commenced reorganization at an earlier point in
time See Bankruptcy Report II No. 606. at 242.
9
Prior to the enactment of the uniform bankruptcy laws in Scandinavia. Norway and Finland had 25
percent minimum payment requirements, and the Swedish bankruptcy laws required at least 50 percent
payment to general unsecured debt Id.
91
reorganization in a timely manner
4"
Today it is clear that section 161 does not ensure
timely reorganization. On the contrary, the Reorganization Inquiry indicates that the
minimum payment requirement in many instances causes reorganization attempts to fail ,
4^
2. Acceptance and Confirmation Under the Danish Bankruptcy Act
Under the current Danish Bankruptcy Act there is a close correlation between the
contents of the composition proposal and the requirements for acceptance and
confirmation of the reorganization Generally, the bankruptcy court cannot confirm the
composition proposal if it does not comply with the Danish Bankruptcy Act
4~"
Thus, the
composition cannot be confirmed if the proposal does not prescribe at least 25 percent
payment to the general unsecured creditors.
423
The payment offered in the proposal also determines the majority of creditors who
must vote to accept the composition
424
The rationale for connecting the acceptance
requirements to the payment offered in the proposal is clear Because the composition is




See the Reorganization Report, at 24 Most of the interviewed bankruptcy lawyers proposed that the
minimum payment requirement ought to be reduced to 10 or 15 percent, or preferably replaced by more
flexible rules on confirmation Id.
" See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec 179. subsec 1. no. 2. Additional requirements are included in
section 179 and 180 of the Danish Bankruptcy Act. See supra Part II B.2 c
3
Unless of course the creditors unanimously have agreed to a lower payment, or special circumstances
apply. See the Danish Bankruptcy Act sec 161.
24
See supra Part II.B.2.C. In terms of amount, the percentage of creditors who vote to accept the proposal
must be at least 100 percent minus the percentage of payment offered, i.e. if 25 percent payment is
offered, at least 75 percent of the creditors, in terms of amount, must vote to accept the proposal. Id. In
addition, at least 60 percent of the number of creditors who participate in the vote must vote to accept the
proposal. Id.
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creditors, the higher the percentage of creditors who accept the proposal should be. 425
However, because most composition proposals only with great difficulty reach the 25
percent minimum payment, the current acceptance provisions generally require the
proposal to be accepted by 70-75 percent of the creditors in terms of amount According
to the Reorganization Inquiry, it is often a problem to get a majority that large to accept
the proposal, and, therefore, the bankruptcy lawyers propose that the acceptance
requirements should be eased
426 A reform of the acceptance requirements is especially
crucial if the proposal to lower the minimum payment requirement from 25 percent to 10
or 15 percent is followed Otherwise a proposal to pay for example 10 percent would
require acceptance by at least 90 percent of the creditors
In the Reorganization Report, the Bankruptcy Committee proposes the current
absolute 25 percent minimum payment requirement changed to a flexible standard which
sets a minimum payment requirement in accordance with the expected payment in a
liquidation proceeding.
427
Furthermore, the Bankruptcy Committee proposes the
acceptance requirements reformed so that the composition is deemed accepted if a simple
majority of the creditors vote to accept the proposal
428
3. Best Interest Test
Because the Danish compulsory composition is limited to nonpriority unsecured debt,
the body of composition creditors can be compared to "the class of unsecured nonpriority
4:5
See Bankruptcy Report II No. 606. at 251.
426
See the Reorganization Report, at 22.
A
~ Id., at 76 This requirement is generally referred to as the "Best Interest Test*.
28
Id., 77. The Bankruptcy Committee does not specify whether this majority should be counted in terms
of amount or the number of creditors who vote to accept the proposal.
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claims" under the Bankruptcy Code. Under section 1 126(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, a
class of claims has accepted the plan if creditors that hold at least two-thirds in amount
and more than one-half in number of the allowed claims have voted to accept the plan
The two-thirds acceptance requirement applies irrespective of the payment offered under
the plan,
4 '
and, therefore, a plan which provides for example for payment of only 5-10
percent can be accepted over the dissent of up to one-third of the creditors However, the
rights of such dissenting creditors are protected by the "best interest test" in section
1129(a)(7)(A)(ii). According to this provision, the creditors must receive under the plan
payment in at least the amount which they would receive if the business was liquidated
The best interest test requires a comparison of the value of the payments under the
plan with the liquidation value of the business Determining the value of the payments
under the plan may be difficult if the payment takes other forms than cash payment, e.g.
payment in the form of issuance of stock interests or promissory notes. ' Determining the
liquidation value of the business requires a calculation of the projected assets recoveries
net of estimated expenses. Thus, the debtor in possession must determine not only the
proceeds from sale of the assets of the estate,
4
but also estimate among other things
recoveries of avoidable transfers, projected profits or losses of the operations during the
9
The unsecured nonpnority creditors are normally included in one class. However, some courts have
held that it is possible to have more than one class of nonpnority unsecured creditors. See supra Part
IIC5.b.
430
Unless full payment is offered thereby making the class unimpaired.
51
In reorganizations under the Bankruptcy Code it is usual that the creditors are partially paid with stock
interests in the reorganized business. Compulsory composition proposals under the Danish Bankruptcy
Act rarely provide for issuance of stock interests to the creditors One reason for this is that the
composition ordinarily does not alter the ownership of the business.
432
The proceeds from a sale of the assets will depend on how fast the business must be liquidated. As a
standard it would seem reasonable that the proceeds obtained from an "orderly" liquidation should be
determinative.
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proceeding, litigation expenses, and other administrative expenses including expenses to
the bankruptcy trustee.
Determining the liquidation value and the value of the payments under the proposal is
primarily a task for the accountants. Therefore, application of a best interest test is likely
to increase the expenses to outside professionals . Furthermore, the best interest test is
likely to make the confirmation proceeding longer and more complicated than the current
confirmation proceedings
434
Nevertheless, replacing the current fixed minimum payment
with a best interest test is a viable solution It will further reorganization and does not
violate the interests of dissenting creditors because they are ensured at least the same
payment as they would receive in the alternative, i.e a liquidation proceeding.
4. Simple Majority and Cramdown
What majority of the creditors must vote to accept the proposal in order for the court
to confirm it 9 In the Reorganization Report, the Danish Bankruptcy Committee proposed
There are no statistics available on what those administrative expenses amount to Under the
Bankruptcy Code, the additional expenses imposed by the best interest test are limited because the Code
requires most of the valuations done anyway under section 362(a) (equity in property), section 363(e)
(adequate protection), section 364(d) (adequate protection), section 506(a) (amount of secured creditors*
claims), and section 547 (insolvency). Although the valuation requirements under the Danish Bankruptcy
Act are less comprehensive, the accountants are involved in the preparation of the reorganization
proposal. Thus, under section 165 of the Damsh Bankruptcy Act. the assignees must prepare information
on the value of the property of the estate, and in addition hereto state whether the proposal is reasonable
and offers sufficient assurance of fulfillment Preparing the information necessary to apply the best
interest test should, therefore, add little to the information the assignees must prepare under the current
bankruptcy laws.
434
Unhappy creditors are likely to attack the valuation standards presented by the debtor in possession. In
order for the court to hear and decide the application of the best interest test some delay in the proceeding
is inevitable
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that a composition proposal which meets the best interest test should be confirmed if it
has been accepted by a simple majority of the general unsecured creditors
4
Because the
Committee relies on the principles of the United States Bankruptcy Code, it is criticizable
that the Committee does not specify whether the required majority is in terms of amount
or number of creditors
436
The simple majority requirement in the Bankruptcy Code
applies only for the number of creditors who vote to accept the plan
41
In addition, the
creditors who vote to accept the plan must hold at least two-thirds of the allowed claims
in the class.
4,8
If one of these requirements are not met, the class is deemed not to have
accepted the plan, and the reorganization can be confirmed only if the requirements for a
cramdown under section 1 129(d) are met.
439
Therefore, under the Bankruptcy Code, if a
plan is supported by only 51 percent of the creditors in terms of both number and amount,
the best interest test alone is not considered sufficient protection Would a best interest
test under the Danish Bankruptcy Act provide sufficient protection of the rights of
dissenting creditors if the composition is supported by only 51 percent of the creditors in
terms of number and amount9 Because of the limited scope of the composition it can be
argued that it would. The risk of violation of the rights of the creditors is small because
there is only one class of claims in the composition There is neither a risk of unfair
discrimination between classes nor is there a risk of discrimination within in the class of
35
See the Reorganization Report, at 77.
Apparently, the Danish Bankruptcy Committee is not entirely familiar with the United States
Bankruptcy Code In its description of the acceptance requirements under the Bankruptcy Code, the
Committee simply states: "The creditors vote in classes. Simple majority in each class is sufficient". Id..
at 43.
431




Section 1 129(d) protects the rights of classes of claims which have not accepted the plan Thus, a plan
can be confirmed only if it does not "discriminate unfairly" and is "fair and equitable"' to the dissenting




° The only apparent risk is that the debtor's proposal under the
circumstances does not offer the creditors a fair payment, and a simple majority
requirement should provide sufficient protection against such abuse
5. Conclusion
The current minimum payment requirement in the Danish Bankruptcy Act should be
replaced by a best interest test Furthermore, the current acceptance and confirmation
provisions, which links the acceptance requirement to the payment offered in the proposal,
should be replaced by a provision requiring only acceptance by a simple majority of the
creditors in terms of both number and amount
" The Danish Bankruptcy Act requires equal treatment of the composition creditors
V. Conclusion
Legislators and bankruptcy practitioners in Denmark agree that the current Danish
Bankruptcy Act is not an effective mean to reorganize financially troubled businesses
Therefore, a reform of the Danish Bankruptcy Act is expected within the next couple of
years To prepare the reform, the Danish Bankruptcy Committee has drafted a
Reorganization Report which includes interviews with Danish bankruptcy lawyers On the
basis of the responses from the bankruptcy lawyers, the Bankruptcy Committee has
prepared a list of factors that cause reorganization attempts to fail This Thesis focuses on
four of the above mentioned problems. Each problem is discussed in a comparative
analyzis of the Danish and the United States bankruptcy laws on reorganization
The first problem which is discussed is the problem of getting the reorganization
initiated in a timely manner Here it is concluded that the decision to initiate
reorganization eventually must be made by the management of the business Furthermore,
it is concluded that it is very difficult to draft bankruptcy laws to further timely
reorganization without, at the same time, causing an unwarranted interference in the lives
of private business entities
The second problem which is discussed is the question of creditor influence and
control of the reorganization It is concluded that the debtor in possession system is
superior to a system which puts the operation of the business in the hands of a trustee
The analyzis of the role of the creditors' committee shows that the committee structure is
effective only in large reorganization cases where the committee can employ professionals
at the expense of the estate In the majority of cases, the creditors
1
committees are
generally passive and do not control or supervise the reorganization The analyzis of the
current Danish structure, which appoints a creditors' representative to supervise and
control the debtor in possession, shows that this system provides an effective control of
the debtor However, it is also concluded that the current control is too restrictive, and
97
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that the day-to-day operation of the business must be trusted with the debtor in
possession.
The third problem which is discussed is the financing of the reorganization It is
concluded that the current priority financing under the Danish Bankruptcy Act is
insufficient Because all the property of the estate usually is encumbered, it is necessary to
allow financing secured ahead of the existing secured creditors It is proposed that
superpriority liens against adequate protection of the rights of the existing secured
creditors are introduced into the Danish Bankruptcy Act
Finally, the problems of minimum payment, acceptance and confirmation requirements
are discussed It is concluded that the current 25 percent minimum payment requirement
should be replaced by a flexible system which determines the minimum payment on the
basis of what the creditors would receive in a liquidation proceeding Furthermore, it is
concluded that the confirmation requirements should be modified to allow confirmation of
compositions which have been accepted by a simple majority of the creditors in terms of
both amount and number
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